U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY

Y 4. F 76/1: N 88/25

U.S. Nuclear Policy, 103-2 Hearing...

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

OCTOBER 5, 1994

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

APR 14 1995

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U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 5, 1994

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:13 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lee H. Hamilton (chairman) presiding.

Chairman HAMILTON. The House Foreign Affairs Committee will come to order.

We meet today to hear testimony from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, John Deutch, regarding U.S. nuclear policy.

I understand the Clinton administration has been conducting this comprehensive nuclear policy review for several months and that the Nuclear Posture Review has been completed. The committee is interested in learning of the results of the Nuclear Posture Review to see how policy has evolved and changed in the post-cold war strategic environment.

Secretary Deutch, your prepared statement will, of course, be entered into the record in full. You may proceed as you choose, summarizing that statement.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN M. DEUTCH, DEPUTY SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to be here this morning to discuss the administration's policy on nuclear weapons.

I am supposed to be accompanied by my friend Ash Carter. He comes from Harvard University, is frequently late. But I hope he will join me because he has been the leading person responsible in our Department, along with General Wes Clark of the Joint Staff, in shepherding this Nuclear Posture Review.

What I would like to do with your permission, Mr. Chairman, is to first summarize the elements of the Nuclear Posture Review and then to address the specific questions that were included in your letter to the Department on January 26.[1]

If I may also, Mr. Chairman, introduce the Under Secretary for Policy, Walt Slocombe, who did not go to Harvard but comes from policy, so he is not always on time either.

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[1] The letter referred to appears in appendix 1.

HISTORY OF NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW

The Nuclear Posture Review is based on the President's national security strategy that was published this July. It states two fundamental principles on which our nuclear policy is based: first, to retain sufficient nuclear forces to deter foreign attacks on the United States or its allies; secondly, to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, to stop that proliferation to other nations of the world.

So those are the two principles on which our nuclear posture is based: on the one hand, deterrence; on the other handled, nonproliferation.

The nuclear policy review was commissioned by Secretary Aspin in 1993. His charge was to examine on a fundamental basis, as had been done for other elements of our force structure in the Bottom-Up Review, the basis for our new nuclear force posture. The review was intended to investigate policy, force structure, programmatic changes required by the end of the cold war.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, the review was completed late in the summer. It has been briefed to the President and accepted by him. The results were announced by Secretary Perry late last month.

MOVE TO SMALLER, SAFER NUCLEAR FORCE STRUCTURE

I also would like to stress this posture review involved all elements of the Department of Defense and has the full support of the military and civilian leadership. The major direction which the posture review has taken us is toward a smaller and safer force structure. That is the principal point: The posture review takes us to a smaller and safer nuclear force structure, with a changed role.

In arriving at that conclusion, we have taken into account a number of different qualitative features. I will just mention to you the policy considerations that led us to a smaller and safer nuclear force structure. We considered nonproliferation. We considered threat reduction with respect to reducing the number of nuclear weapons in nations of the former Soviet Union. We considered stockpile stewardship, how to maintain our nuclear weapons without nuclear testing. We considered declaratory policy associated with our nuclear posture. Of course, we considered important deterrence, commitments to allies, including the NATO alliance. And, very importantly, we considered the stability of the nuclear force structure we were proposing.

As Bill Perry stressed, the posture was intended to both lead—lead to further reductions in nuclear weapons and also to hedge against the possibility that developments in Russia do not go as we have hoped. Those are the elements, the policy elements that led us to the results of the Nuclear Posture Review toward a smaller and safer force structure.

REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR ARSENAL

Before summarizing very briefly the results of the posture review, let me say that the whole review must be seen in the context of the massive reductions that have taken place in our nuclear arsenal since 1988, the height of the cold war. These massive reduc-

tions have resulted in the world being a safer place and in a nuclear posture which is more suitable to today's political-military circumstances.

First of all, we have the prospect since 1988 of further reductions with START I, the ratification of START II, and the planned early withdrawal of warheads before its final limits come into force in 2003 which was announced at the recent summit by President Clinton and President Yeltsin.

A brief summary would say from 1988 compared to today U.S. strategic warheads have been reduced 47 percent; nonstrategic warheads reduced 90 percent; the total active stockpile is down 60 percent; and we have had many programmatic reductions and cancellations of nuclear programs. We are spending 70 percent less dollars on our nuclear programs than in 1988 and have 70 percent fewer individuals involved in these programs.

What you see is this country has been—since 1988, the height of the cold war—understandably and correctly bringing down its nuclear force posture consistent with arms control negotiations and the changed political circumstances in the world. So the results that I am about to summarize for you, Mr. Chairman, indeed have to be seen in the context of that overall trend.

SUMMARY OF FORCE REDUCTION PROPOSALS

Let me begin summarizing the results of the Nuclear Posture Review by the force reductions.

First, we are proposing to reduce the number of strategic ballistic missile submarines from 18 to 14; and we propose to retrofit the 4 additional submarines from 10 to 14 with the D–5 Trident II missile.

Second, we propose to reduce the B–52 fleet, which is dual capable for both conventional and nuclear missions, from 94 to 66.

Third, we intend to maintain 20 nuclear capable B–2s and a 500/450 Minuteman fleet force.

These are the main force reduction proposals of the Nuclear Posture Review.

With respect to nonstrategic nuclear weapons, we propose to eliminate entirely the capability of surface naval ships to carry nuclear weapons. For some period of time, we have not carried nuclear weapons on surface ships but maintain the capability to do so should that prove necessary. But in order to save resources and save training time and dual capability on the surface war ships, we propose to eliminate entirely the capability to carry nuclear weapons on surface naval ships. We will maintain the capability for nuclear Tomahawk cruise missiles to be launched by attack submarines.

Finally, we will maintain dual capable tactical aircraft both in the United States and in Europe. The latter, maintaining dual capable tactical aircraft in Europe, is in large measure because of our alliance commitments within NATO.

REDUCTIONS BEYOND THE START II FORCE STRUCTURE

The third point I would like to make about the conclusions of the Nuclear Posture Review is that this force structure I summarized is based on the assumption that START II enters into force soon

and its final limits take effect in 2003. As I mentioned already, the summit declaration makes clear the willingness of this administration to consider deeper reductions.

These future reductions will be especially attractive in the strategic nuclear arsenal if it includes at the same time consideration of nonstrategic nuclear weapons which have a different role to play, a much changed role to play from the cold war to today where there has not been the same degree of attention placed as yet, up till now.

So the point I want to make very strongly is that the Nuclear Posture Review, while based on a START II force level, allows and permits and expects consideration of further reductions should conditions permit and negotiations allow during the next period.

IMPROVEMENTS ADDRESSED IN POLICY REVIEW

Let me mention other important subjects that were addressed in the nuclear posture review. First, we are continuing improvements to the command, control and communications of our nuclear forces. This is a very important aspect of nuclear forces stewardship in this country—attention to early warning, connectivity of the nuclear forces to the national command authority, and our ability to pass secure messages between the national command authority and the nuclear forces.

Second, we have proposed a series of improvements in the safety and security and use control of nuclear weapons with the smaller stockpile that we are going to be maintaining. Let me just mention one example: The advanced permissive action devices, so-called coded control devices, will be introduced into the B–52s, the Minuteman IIIs and eventually into the Trident force as well.

Third, the Nuclear Posture Review included attention to infrastructure for the nuclear forces of this country—for example, the requirements that we as a customer place upon the Department of Energy for their nuclear weapons activities.

Fourth, the Nuclear Posture Review addressed in a very serious way our other initiatives in nuclear forces having to do with nonproliferation and cooperative threat reduction with the Soviet Union that are an integral part of our policy which leads us to try and reduce the dependence on nuclear weapons throughout the world and have other nations move to smaller or zero nuclear arsenals which are safer and under control.

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, what I would like to do is to submit a copy of the view graphs, the unclassified view graphs for the record so that members of the committee and the staff can study the complete summary of the report.

Chairman HAMILTON. Without objection, that will be made part of the record.

[The information referred to, together with Secretary Deutch's prepared statement, appear at the conclusion of the hearing.]

NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND TARGETING

Mr. DEUTCH. Secondly, Mr. Chairman, I would like to answer the questions, at least briefly, in your letter to the Department of January 26. There were, I believe, six sets of questions raised in that letter. I would like to touch on each one of them at least briefly.

Questions one and two had to do with nuclear strategy and targeting. As I have emphasized, all of our nuclear forces are designed primarily for deterrence. The purpose of our nuclear forces is to deter violence, not to be used in any conflict situation. Deterrence is the hallmark of assessing the nuclear force posture of this country.

Second, the triad has been rebalanced. While we maintain a triad, it has been rebalanced from land-based ICBMs, intercontinental ballistic missiles, to bombers and submarines.

Third, targeting has been dramatically changed from the height of the cold war. There are vastly fewer targets, requiring vastly fewer nuclear weapons. We have become much smarter in our targeting and not hitting every possible aim point but asking what are the minimum number of aim points required to hold at-risk targets and underpin deterrence.

Next, both technological and policy reasons have led us to a greater number of options for nuclear attacks because of the more complicated structure that we faced with our former adversary, the former Soviet Union.

Finally, I would say our targeting includes distinctions between target classes. We are not anticipating that deterrence is served by just threatening one massive retaliation.

NUCLEAR SAFETY

Your third question included in your letter has to do with nuclear safety. We are confident in the safety and security of our nuclear stockpile, and we have taken additional measures as a result of the Nuclear Posture Review to improve the safety and security of the stockpile, as I have mentioned to you, both in the areas of security and in the areas of command, control and communications. And they will be funded under existing departmental totals throughout the 5-year program period.

The administration is committed to achieving a comprehensive test ban and to taking those steps necessary to ensure the reliability of our stockpile in the absence of nuclear testing.

STATUS OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

The fourth question you asked in your letter, Mr. Chairman, had to do with the status of arms control. As I mentioned, we are committed to prompt ratification of START II. President Clinton and President Yeltsin proposed an exchange of instruments of ratification at next year's summit. We are also committed to the early deactivation of warheads as soon as START II is ratified before the final limits come into force in 2003. The administration, Mr. Chairman, is supportive of the ABM Treaty as a central element of our strategy to maintain strategic stability.

An important matter within the ABM Treaty is the demarcation between strategic and theater antiballistic missile systems which is ambiguous within the present treaty. We are pursuing a resolution of this ambiguity with respect to theater ballistic missile defense in the Standing Consultative Commission.

While it would be inappropriate for me to address here the precise elements of our negotiating position, let me say I believe there is general agreement with the Russians about the need for clari-

fication and a general interest by both the Russians and the United States to have the possibility of theater ballistic missile defense systems to deter against Third World country threats and the prospect that nations, over time, will gain ballistic missile capability to deliver conventional, chemical or even nuclear weapons against adversaries throughout the world.

We believe we will be able to resolve successfully the demarcation line between theater ballistic missile defense systems and strategic antiballistic missile systems without invading the primacy of the ABM Treaty.

PROLIFERATION ISSUES

The fifth question you addressed in your letter was nuclear proliferation. I would like to emphasize that nuclear proliferation is central to the administration's overall national security policy. We are seeking the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Nonproliferation Treaty at next year's conference. We are working on export controls in a post-COCOM era in order to ensure there is not export of technology to countries which are trying to acquire nuclear weapons capability in some areas of the world.

We are also working very strongly with Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union to improve materials accountability and control and reduce the possibility of leakage of materials or sensitive technology to other nations. And, of course, we are devoting a great deal of attention to the issue of North Korea's nuclear program.

CONFIRM NOR DENY POLICY

Mr. Chairman, there is an additional question in your letter concerning our policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world. That policy is currently under review, although, as you know, Mr. Chairman, there have been good reasons for adopting such a policy in the past.

I hope I have not gone on too long, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to summarize for you the results of the Nuclear Posture Review and at least give you some initial response to the specific questions raised in your letter.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Deutch appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]

Chairman HAMILTON. Do your colleagues have anything to add?

Mr. DEUTCH. No, sir.

ASSESSING THE NUCLEAR THREAT

Chairman HAMILTON. We will proceed now with questions.

I want to begin with the question of threat. Do we have any potential enemies among the nuclear weapon states?

Mr. DEUTCH. Let me just mention who the nuclear weapon states are, and your judgment on whether there are enemies or not is perhaps better than mine. I am not sure——

Chairman HAMILTON. Isn't that your job, to know who our enemies are?

Mr. DEUTCH. It certainly is my job to know who our enemies are. It is not always my job to draw attention to that in public.

The nuclear weapon states you know as well as I. Let me say they range from Russia—here I think there is no question about the fact they are not an enemy. There is also no question about the fact that we have to be concerned about their future political course. China. Then it runs through other countries; we have a whole series of possibilities there. We have some nations in the world whom we know are acquiring nuclear weapons capability who are very definitely enemies: North Korea.

Chairman HAMILTON. I am trying to get an idea of what nuclear weapon states threaten us. What is the nuclear threat to us today?

Mr. DEUTCH. I don't believe there is an urgent problem, and it certainly is much reduced from what it was 5 years ago. Our policy is to have a deterrent posture to ensure that that is the case in the future.

I am not saying we have an eminent nuclear threat today. It is significantly reduced from what it was 5 years ago. I would like to ensure we have a posture that maintains that reduced threat in the future.

U.S. POLICY ON USE

Chairman HAMILTON. When would the United States use nuclear weapons?

Mr. DEUTCH. My hope is never, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HAMILTON. Under what circumstances might we use nuclear weapons?

Mr. DEUTCH. Mr. Chairman, my answer to that question is the purpose of these weapons and the purpose of their credibility to be used is to deter anybody from using nuclear weapons against us or our allies. Their value is in their deterrence capability.

Chairman HAMILTON. Do we subscribe to a no-first-use doctrine?

Mr. DEUTCH. We do not, nor would I recommend it, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HAMILTON. Do we subscribe to a doctrine of defensive last resort?

Mr. DEUTCH. I wouldn't characterize that as a policy, a position we have. It is a deterrent, sir. It is like a lifeboat on a ship. You do not want to use it. It is there in case it is needed to be used. But it also deters people from trying to coerce you in political or military ways or to use nuclear weapons against your allies.

Chairman HAMILTON. In 1978, President Carter announced that the United States would never use nuclear weapons against a nonnuclear weapons state unless it was acting as an ally of a state with nuclear weapons. Do we subscribe to that?

Mr. DEUTCH. Yes. I believe you are referring to our negative security assurance. We do subscribe to that, which states, in part, that we will not use nuclear weapons against a nonnuclear state party to the NPT or any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices unless that state attacks the United States or its allies when allied to a nuclear weapons state or associated with a nuclear weapons state in carrying out or sustaining the attack.

ADEQUACY OF U.S. CONVENTIONAL DETERRENT

Chairman HAMILTON. Is there any threat to the United States' interests—I guess I should say vital interests—that cannot be met by conventional weapons?

Mr. DEUTCH. Today.

Chairman HAMILTON. Yes.

Mr. DEUTCH. I would say not, sir.

If I may, Mr. Chairman, I don't think the security of the United States would be improved nor would the prospects for peace in the world be improved if we imagined a situation where the United States had no nuclear weapons and other nations of the world possessed nuclear weapons. That I don't think would add to stability or the prospects for peace in the world, sir.

Chairman HAMILTON. Then why do we need nuclear weapons today?

Mr. DEUTCH. We need nuclear weapons to deter other nations that possess nuclear weapons and to deter other nations who possess nuclear weapons from their use against us or our allies.

DIFFERENCES FROM PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION'S NUCLEAR POSTURE

Chairman HAMILTON. Is there any difference in your Nuclear Posture Review and the nuclear policy that you inherited in January of 1993?

Mr. DEUTCH. We are continuing a policy of reducing the size of our stockpile. We are placing greater emphasis on the safety, security and use control of the weapons that we retain. We have much stronger initiatives both in cooperative threat reduction with the states of the former Soviet Union and in nonproliferation.

Mr. Chairman, I think in matters of nuclear policy, nuclear force structure, it is much to the credit of this country that it has had a persistent, nonpartisan path here of reduction from the height of the cold war.

We are continuing to bring down the Trident submarines. That is definitely different from the last administration. The B–52s are being reduced. This administration has detargeted our nuclear forces so they are no longer targeted at any country. Generally speaking, I think we are continuing the process as a nation of fewer nuclear weapons and safer nuclear weapons.

Chairman HAMILTON. So the changes you have made from the previous administration are certainly not dramatic. They would be evolutionary more than anything else?

Mr. DEUTCH. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

STATUS OF U.S.-RUSSIAN TALKS

Chairman HAMILTON. Now, you put off any new nuclear arms reductions talks with Russia for the time being; is that correct?

Mr. DEUTCH. No, sir. I wouldn't characterize it that way at all. In fact, I am especially sensitive on this point because I want to express to you the Department's view that arms reductions in the right context can be advantageous to approving stability and security in this country.

What we have said is that until we have gone through the ratification of START II that we do not think it is reasonable to program

forces less than the levels called for in START II. We have supported the President's initiative to deactivate the forces as soon as START II——

Chairman HAMILTON. Your focus is more on the implementation of the agreements that we now have rather than reaching new agreements to reduce our nuclear arsenals further. Is that a fair statement?

Mr. DEUTCH. Because of our programmatic responsibilities, I think that that is a fair statement.

U.S. RESPONSE TO CONVENTIONAL ATTACK

Chairman HAMILTON. Let me go back to doctrine for a moment.

We retained the option of using nuclear weapons even after a nonnuclear attack; is that correct?

Mr. DEUTCH. As I mentioned earlier, under our negative security assurance, we do retain that option. However, the purpose of our counterproliferation initiatives is to fashion nonnuclear responses to weapons of mass destruction threat or use.

Chairman HAMILTON. OK. Mr. Gejdenson.

TRANSFER OF FISSILE MATERIAL FROM FORMER SOVIET UNION

Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

One of the things that I think troubles a lot of people is the inability to get multilateral agreements on some of this technology. And, at least in the news stories, there seems to be a growing concern that a significant amount of fissionable material has gotten out of the former Soviet Union, that historically being one of the more significant challenges to building nuclear weapons.

What are we doing at this stage to try to, one, get control—get the Soviets, former Soviets, get control of their fissionable material?

STATUS OF EXPORT CONTROL AGREEMENTS

And it seems to me, having worked on the Export Administration Act for some time, that one of the challenges if I were another country doing business with the United States is the United States at times has wanted to control things that are so generally available that control is virtually impossible. If I were a foreign government looking at a partnership with the United States, I would, frankly, be somewhat hesitant to engage in an agreement.

I can give you examples of the United States blocking sales of 30, 40-year-old computers to Vietnam in previous administrations because—not because they provided any kind of technology threat but we were mad at Vietnam over the Vietnam war still so we were using COCOM in that manner.

It seems to me the thing we need to do is find out what the critical technologies are and move with the nations that control them or we end up in an exercise of making nice speeches but having little impact on the proliferation of either nuclear, chemical on biological questions.

I guess my two-part question is, first, do you have a sense the former Soviets are on the way to controlling the fissionable mate-

rial? Where are we in multilateral agreements to control the technology that is necessary.

FISSILE MATERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

Mr. DEUTCH. Both of these are very important questions.

Certainly, assisting the states of the former Soviet Union on materials accountability and not allowing either material or sensitive technology to be diverted from these countries to unstable states is a very centrally important part of the initiatives we have taken.

With your permission, I would like to ask Ash Carter, who has been essentially involved in this, to address that aspect.

Mr. CARTER.[2] Thank you, Dr. Deutch.

Mr. Gejdenson, the focus on what is popularly called loose nukes—which is not nuclear weapons, but fissile material—is a central focus of our threat reductions under Nunn-Lugar, and figured centrally in the summit.

As you are aware, we are increasing cooperation with law enforcement in Russia, with the Ministry of Atomic Power there, which is the custodian of nuclear materials, and with the Ministry of Defense, which is the custodian of weapons.

From start to finish, from the production of materials to the custody of finished weapons, we are working with Russia, and also with the other states of the former Soviet Union, to make sure these items are reduced and weapons are eliminated as fast as possible and that the materials are safeguarded.

That is a primary effort. The posture review highlighted it. The recent summit highlighted it.

EXPORT CONTROL POLICY

Mr. DEUTCH. The second part of your question, export controls.

I think Bill Perry has probably the best record at advocating reduction of export controls for categories that make no sense, of which computers is a paramount example. I believe it was his initiative that led to the great relaxation in really quite unenforceable and not rational computer rules.

Just as Bill Perry is, certainly I and the Department are very eager to lower historical export control barriers which inhibit legitimate commerce from this country.

Simultaneously, we think the one area that deserves our greatest scrutiny and effort is to assure that sensitive technology has application—either single use or dual use—to weapons of mass destruction, whether it is biological, chemical or nuclear, deserves to be followed up very aggressively by this country with our allies to find a common policy in this area, and we are still searching for that.

PACE OF U.S./RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS REDUCTIONS

Mr. GEJDENSON. Two final comments. I always had the sense that the United States, in dealing with Gorbachev, there were multiple missed opportunities both for assisting democracy in the Soviet Union and reaching agreements on weapons and other sys-

[2] Hon. Ashton B. Carter is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy.

tems. I hope we are not moving too slowly now in the reduction of nuclear weapons with the Russians.

It is a hard call from where I sit. You, obviously, have a better seat on this. I hope we move as quickly as we can so we do not end up in the same shape 5 or 6 years from now, saying, gee, we missed an opportunity to reduce these things.

I had a meeting with one of the managers for the Ukraine Safety Program. He said he neither had the money to buy spare parts for his operating nuclear power plants or pay many of his managers. You know, that kind of situation just is ripe for crisis, either fissionable material or cataclysmic disasters. I think we have to be sure we use every bit of our resources to make sure those situations are avoided.

Mr. DEUTCH. Yes, sir.

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Bereuter.

ABILITY TO RECONSTITUTE U.S. NUCLEAR FORCES

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Deutch, I have a couple of questions to get through in a hurry, if it is possible to respond briefly.

The Nuclear Posture Review discusses the importance of maintaining our flexibility in the event that reform in Russia fails. Does that mean that retention of the U.S. ability to reconstitute our nuclear forces is a priority? If it is a priority, do we have any problems?

Mr. DEUTCH. The flexibility to upload is included in our program. Yes, sir.

Mr. BEREUTER. Do we have major shortcomings that bother you in that respect?

Mr. DEUTCH. No.

PACE OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR DRAWDOWN

Mr. BEREUTER. Secretary Perry stated in his speech of September 20 that, even with a friendly Russia, we are concerned that its overall drawdown of nuclear weapons is going more slowly than the U.S. strategic force reductions. If we are worried about reform in Russia failing, which I would consider to be a logical fear, doesn't it follow we should move as quickly as we can in reducing the Russian weapons arsenal? And when the Secretary says Russia is too slow in drawing down the nuclear weapons, how does he quantify that?

Mr. DEUTCH. I think this points to a previous question.

Mr. BEREUTER. Yes, it does.

Mr. DEUTCH. We want to drawdown nuclear weapons with the Russians, both strategic and nonstrategic, as rapidly as possible. For that, we have to have confidence both stockpiles are being demilitarized as rapidly as possible.

Bill Perry's comment points to the need to assess how rapidly the Russians are doing it and not to move too fast in front of them. Although we are leading them in our reductions, we do not want to get too far ahead of them. This matter was discussed with the Russian delegation. We are going to try to assure we are synchronizing our reductions.

U.S./RUSSIAN WARHEAD DISMANTLEMENT

Mr. BEREUTER. If I can focus on warheads, how many have we dismantled? How many have they dismantled?

Mr. DEUTCH. I think I will be safer giving you an answer for the record. Let me say, in our case, we went from tens of thousands to a figure which is much more—I don't know whether it is an unclassified number for it, but in the range of 5,000 weapons, something like that. We will provide one for the record.

[The information follows:]

Since 1991, the Russians have dismantled at least 5,000 nuclear warheads. That year also saw a halt in the production of new nuclear weapons in the United States. Since that time, the United States has dismantled over 4,800 warheads. In addition, there is a significant backlog of warheads awaiting dismantlement. Because of this large number of retirements, coupled with the Department of Energy's limited capacity for dismantling warheads, the current backlog of retired weapons will persist for a few more years.

Mr. BEREUTER. Can you say whether or not the Russians have proportionately reduced as much as we have reduced at this point?

Mr. DEUTCH. My view is that they have not gone quite as fast as we have, but that may be because of different technical and economic constraints that they face. We are working with them in our cooperative threat reduction program to help give them momentum to continue the decline. The fact they have not perhaps gone in exactly the same way in their reductions we have may really represent technical and economic constraints on them rather than political differences.

RESULTS OF NUNN-LUGAR EXPENDITURES

Mr. BEREUTER. We have authorized and appropriated $1.2 billion in Nunn-Lugar funds to assist in dismantlement of weapons in Russia and additional funds for the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Can you quantify how much of a difference this program made compared to what Russia would have done on its own without Nunn-Lugar?

Mr. DEUTCH. Let me say to you I think the difference is most dramatic in the case of the Ukraine and Kazakhstan which were nuclear powers that had agreed to pull out all of their nuclear weapons. That, I would say, is almost a complete success. It certainly was uncertain a year and a half ago. That is a major accomplishment.

I think that the programs that Ash Carter mentioned under Nunn-Lugar are making a significant difference in helping the Russians continue the momentum in their drawdown. It has further to go. We are still pushing the program very hard.

ABM TREATY CLARIFICATION

Mr. BEREUTER. Shifting subjects, as I understand it, the United States is seeking a clarification of the ABM Treaty to enable tests of missile defense systems traveling at 5 kilometers per second. Has Russia agreed to that clarification?

Mr. DEUTCH. They have not agreed to that yet. As I mentioned in my comments, we are in negotiation with them on drawing the

demarcation line between strategic ballistic missile defense and theater ballistic missile defense.

Mr. BEREUTER. Does this give you strategic missile defense capability?

Mr. DEUTCH. In my judgment, if you look at the purposes of the ABM Treaty, which is really to maintain stability, whatever marginal theoretical effectiveness it might have against a strategic ballistic missile it has no credible capability against a strategic missile attack from Russia or some other country.

Mr. BEREUTER. No credible capability?

Mr. DEUTCH [continuing]. Effectiveness against an attack from Russia, China, whatever country you might imagine could be attacking the United States with strategic missiles.

Mr. BEREUTER. What are we doing now diplomatically with Russia to get a clarification on this subject of the ABM treaty in this kind of testing system?

Mr. DEUTCH. We have had a series of negotiations with them. I believe one is being held, in fact, next week in Geneva with the Standing Consultative Commission or the SCC, so-called, the Commission setup under the ABM Treaty to address questions of this type.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Berman.

PROSPECTS FOR A NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, let me ask you, first, in the hypothetical world where you could have absolute certainty about the verification of it, given the vast superiority of U.S. conventional forces, wouldn't it make sense to be able to do away with all nuclear weapons?

Mr. DEUTCH. If you could verify no one had nuclear weapons and verify they did not have the capability to do it soon, to break out soon, unquestionably the world would be a better place without nuclear weapons.

The issue is, is it physically possible to turn the time back? There is no question about it. Nuclear weapons are a massive, massive risk for mankind, womankind. The issue is how do you get the clock back.

Mr. BERMAN. When the chairman asked you earlier about the purpose of our nuclear weapons, you indicated to deter a nuclear attack and—then you sort of drifted off. I wondered what were you thinking before you decided not to say it?

Mr. DEUTCH. Mr. Berman, I am not sure what I was thinking. I would have to go back to the question.

Mr. BERMAN. Is there any other purpose for our nuclear weapons arsenal other than deterring nuclear attack?

Mr. DEUTCH. I would say not. I thought I was clear about that.

RATIONALE FOR RETAINING FIRST-USE OPTION

Mr. BERMAN. All right. Then why are we keeping a first-use option? What is the strategic logic behind that?

Mr. DEUTCH. The argument here is, Mr. Berman, that deterrence is based on the credibility of use. That is how you deter——

Mr. BERMAN. I thought it was on the survivability of——

Mr. DEUTCH. Part of the credibility of use says, I can survive anything you throw at me and still get back at you. An element of the credibility of use is survivability.

The point about deterrence is that it is the realism of it, the credibility of its use is what makes it a deterrent. If you just say I have stacks of nuclear weapons, no credible way of delivering them or using them, they are not a deterrent and will not deter any country from an action that they might take in a moment of lunacy.

Mr. BERMAN. Well, in a moment of lunacy, who knows what is what? I cannot understand the first-use issue in this regard. Why can't you be more credible in indicating your intent to use in response?

I thought, originally, the first-use doctrine was essentially something done to deter the overwhelmingly numerically superior conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact countries against a conventional attack in Europe. We can debate whether it was or not, but that was it.

Given that that is not a threat, I still don't understand what the first-use issue provides about retaliation threat and capability?

DETERRENT VALUE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Mr. DEUTCH. I think, Mr. Berman, your example was quite consistent with the point I was trying to make, perhaps unsuccessfully, that the credible use of nuclear weapons can deter hostile military action.

In the old days, in the cold war days, this was the possibility of a massive conventional assault by the Soviet Union on Western Europe. Whether you believe it or not, the argument was, do nuclear weapons, which were stationed over in Western Europe, deter the possibility of massive conventional attack? Today, we do not face that prospect.

Let me give you another example. Let's assume there is a Saddam Hussein, a Colonel Qadhafi somewhere who is considering chemical attack against the United States, against one of its cities and will eventually, unfortunately, have the ability to deliver that by a ballistic missile. The fact we have nuclear weapons could well deter him from that hostile action.

I am not saying we would use them. I am saying deterrence in a situation like that is important.

Mr. BERMAN. Then you sort of have to amend your earlier answer to indicate that the existence of our nuclear weapons, making sure they are available, is to deter nuclear attack and other kinds of attacks?

Mr. DEUTCH. I believe that is right. I think that we have to be clear on the negative security assurance that has been given here. So the examples I chose are people who are not members of the NPT and who are attacking the United States. But barring that——

Mr. BERMAN. I don't think Iraq is a member in good standing of the NPT.

Mr. DEUTCH. Actually, Iraq is still a member of the NPT. However, it is an important point you are raising. Though I may not

have done it carefully enough or eloquently enough, I think you and I are headed in the same direction.

THE CASE FOR EXPEDITED NUCLEAR WEAPONS REDUCTIONS

Mr. BERMAN. My final question then is why isn't this time of our uncertainty about what might happen in Russia—why isn't this the time to push as hard as possible to get an even greater reduction in nuclear warheads and the dismantling, not the shelving of nuclear warheads, as soon as possible because of that uncertainty?

In other words, why is uncertainty a reason to go slow? Why isn't it a reason to push for verifiable and more dramatic reductions?

Mr. DEUTCH. What I say is exactly correct. We have to be sure the dismantlement is taking place at the rate we expect.

An important point here is not signing pieces of paper but actually seeing the dismantlement take place. I would say to you what is the rate-limiting step here, what is stopping progress, is not the willingness of the U.S. Government to enter into a new agreement. It is to actually implement and execute past agreements, both START I and START II, which has not taken place yet.

We are moving as rapidly as we can. We certainly see, both the military and civilians in the Department of Defense, potential advantages to our national security for agreements.

Mr. BERMAN. OK.

DEBATE ON VALUE OF ABM TREATY

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We have 10 minutes before we have to go vote. We have 6 to 7 minutes to ask questions. I thought I would take my time to ask the questions now.

Regarding the ABM Treaty—you say the purpose of that treaty was to create stability. I would submit to you that the purpose of the treaty was to create stability in a world far different than the world we have today. To the degree the ABM Treaty inhibits our defense against a ballistic missile attack, don't you think it has outlived its usefulness and is counterproductive to the United States of America?

Mr. DEUTCH. A national ABM system? A system to protect the United States against——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Our ability to develop any effective antimissile system, be it ballistic missiles, short range missiles, long range missiles, isn't the ABM Treaty counterproductive, considering the fact that the ABM Treaty was developed at the time of mutually assured destruction?

Deterrence 20 years ago was the most important thing we had to protect ourselves against nuclear attack. Deterrence, however, has no impact whatsoever on "nut cases" like Korea, Iran, or any other rogue country that may get a missile into their hands. That type of deterrence won't work with them, because they know the United States won't retaliate with nuclear weapons. An ABM Treaty that still prevents us from developing a missile protection system against that threat, isn't that counterproductive to our interests?

Mr. DEUTCH. Sir, let me say that I guess I don't quite get—how you define the ABM Treaty. I think before I could answer that yes or no I would have to know what you want to accomplish.

Excuse me, sir. May I finish, sir? May I finish?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You stated the administration adequately changed policies in this area from the last administration. Yet, I seem to see an administration that is hell bent on totally reversing the policy in terms of our missile defense production that the last administration was committed to.

It seems to me that this continued dedication to the antiquated ABM Treaty is now totally outdated. We cannot produce a missile defense system that can protect us against the threats of the future, because of the ABM Treaty. This is totally counterproductive to our interests, don't you agree?

Mr. DEUTCH. Briefly, sir, I do not agree with you that nut cases cannot be deterred. We certainly saw the deterrence of a nut case in the situation of Iraq where they did not use chemical weapons because they were concerned, I believe, about what our response would have been if they had been used.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You will admit to me, however, that if Saddam Hussein had had missiles that were capable of reaching the United States the whole situation would have been totally different. And yet the United States, according to the policy of your administration, is still not developing a system to defend ourselves against that potential theat.

Mr. DEUTCH. There is no risk in the foreseeable future of Saddam Hussein or others like him developing a missile system that can reach the United States.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Is it conceivable to you that several missiles could end up missing in the former Soviet Union and emerge in Iran or Iraq? Is that totally impossible?

Mr. DEUTCH. Yes.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, I am very pleased that you think it is impossible. There are others who do not believe that it is impossible.

Mr. DEUTCH. There is an important line which should be carefully discussed about when does an ABM Treaty—when is an ABM Treaty not in the United States' interests. Is there a condition——

And I am sorry to take the time to do this, sir. I know you want to ask your questions. I would like to answer them.

The ABM Treaty was arrived at in 1972. The technical political circumstances of the world are quite different.

It is legitimate to ask under what circumstances would we want to adjust the treaty. What are the political, military risks and technical matters bearing on that?

We did look at that carefully in the Bottom-Up Review. I think we had a careful and defensible story both on political, military and technical grounds for our position on the subject.

U.S. TRITIUM PRODUCTION

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I believe what is happening is that—well, at any rate, I will go into my last question.

Are American tritium plants being closed? Are we going to have the tritium in the future to modernize our nuclear weapon systems?

Mr. DEUTCH. All tritium production facilities in this country are closed.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Are being closed?

Mr. DEUTCH. Are closed. We will have in place an alternative to tritium production to produce the tritium we need for our weapons. Absolutely.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. At what date will we again be producing?

Mr. DEUTCH. I don't think we have any credible need for that, depending upon the various assumptions, until the first decade of the next century.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. How long does it take to build a tritium plant?

Mr. DEUTCH. Depends on the one you have in mind.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. One necessary for our security.

Mr. DEUTCH. Five, 6, 7 years.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You feel we have a little leeway here?

Mr. DEUTCH. Yes. This is not something I feel about. This is something I know.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. OK. We are very concerned about that. There are some people that believe we do not have that leeway that you indicated. That is your job. I know you take that very seriously.

Mr. DEUTCH. I do, sir.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I do not question that at all.

Mr. DEUTCH. OK.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I may question your strategy, however.

Mr. DEUTCH. I used to be Under Secretary of the Department of Energy. I take particular concern and interest with not only my current responsibility but my former one as well. This one, we have—will be all right.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We may have a difference on some strategic ideas of where ABM treaties fit in, but I am sure you are watching our interests there, too.

Thank you very much.

SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE TREATY

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Secretary, I am the last one. Bear with me.

Mr. DEUTCH. Absolutely, sir. I have all day.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I want to commend you for the tremendous work you have done, and Secretary Perry, by giving us the sense of urgency in the Nuclear Posture Review. I certainly agree we must maintain a vision to preparing while Russia undergoes a dramatic political and economic transition.

I am heartened to see, under the review you submitted for the committee's review, it can accomplish simultaneously at least with our security, while at the same time reducing our nuclear risks globally.

Since 1988, America has done her share by reducing our active nuclear stockpiles by 59 percent, our strategic warheads by some 47 percent. We have eliminated the nuclear roles of the Army and Marines, while scaling back the nuclear roles of the Navy and Air Force.

Additionally, strategic bombers have been taken off the earth, and the United States has terminated almost all of its nuclear modernization programs. That is my understanding. Correct me if I am wrong.

I applaud all these initiatives. I remember back in the days of the Reagan administration.

I still have serious questions I want to share with you. I wanted to see what the administration's view is on this.

It is my understanding the ASEAN countries are moving toward establishing a nuclear free zone treaty concept in a very similar vein as has been the case with the several South Pacific island nations. I note you commented concerning the nuclear free zone treaty that, by the way it was written by our Government, that the major provisions of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone provision was written by our Government.

For some unknown reason, somebody pulled the plug. For 6 years now we are still dragging our feet on this issue as to why we have not been a signatory to this South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone treaty.

Do you anticipate, Mr. Secretary, we may have to wait another 100 years? Is there something wrong with the fact we wrote the darn thing yet we are giving these island countries the runaround?

We have seen the success of the nuclear free zone concepts. For the reason why there is none present in Latin America is because we have the nuclear free zone treaty in Latin America. That is why Argentina and Brazil have not done this particular thing.

I am curious. What seems to be the problem? Is the Department of Defense so fearful of the French nuclear testing program in the Pacific we accede to the French that they should continue their nuclear testings in French Polynesia? What is the problem? I am curious.

It has been 6 years now. We are still giving these island countries the runaround. Why not say yes or no? Agree. Disagree. We continued—we continue giving this very fuzzy answer as we have done for the past 6 years. I am curious. What is the problem?

Mr. DEUTCH. Sir, I don't want to give you another fuzzy answer. I fear I am going to. I think this is a matter which is still in negotiation. Perhaps what we could do is get you a full briefing on where we stand, what our problems are, where we are going with it in private, if that is suitable for you, sir.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Can you comment on the fact that when the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone treaty was being entertained and considered by the island countries in the Pacific, the State Department as well as the Department of Defense was fully consulted? Every provision of that proposed treaty was under close consultations with our Government? This was in the Reagan administration is my understanding.

I am puzzled. What security problems are we faced with if we sign into this, especially when Russia and China have already signed into the protocols? Is there a real serious problem? Does it in any way negate our ability to continue making sure our ships, our aircrafts are not in any way restricted by boats from our own nuclear bombs, if you will, around the Pacific? What is the problem?

Mr. DEUTCH. Sir, I would like to, first of all, emphasize the sentence which is in my testimony. That while the government has not signed this protocol, we have assured the South Pacific nations

that our behavior in the region will not be inconsistent with the protocol.

You can say to me, isn't that an elaborate way to avoid signing it? Again, sir, I would like to suggest that your question—and your question and comments bear on it—that we come to you in private and give you a little bit more of a sense of what our concerns are here.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Fair enough. I will look forward to that briefing. This is a closed briefing?

Mr. DEUTCH. Just for you. We will come to your office.

STATUS OF "NEITHER CONFIRM NOR DENY" POLICY

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. All right.

Did your posture review assess the U.S. Navy's policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons in U.S. naval vessels?

Mr. DEUTCH. Our posture review did consider that. We are reconsidering it now in an interagency forum. I believe there are excellent reasons for why that policy has been held in the past, but we are now currently reconsidering it.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Do you need this policy any more? Is it your stated policy to not have nuclear weapons on U.S. naval vessels?

Mr. SLOCOMBE.[3] That is not the policy. The policy is to eliminate the capacity for American surface ships to carry nuclear weapons. We will retain the possibility of carrying nuclear armed cruise missiles on attack submarines, and we are looking at this issue, but the argument in the past has always been that once you begin answering a question, you create an impossible situation in certain circumstances.

In other words, a sail training ship obviously never had nuclear weapons on board. But we, as a matter of principle, would not describe kinds of weapons that we had on particular U.S. ships or aircraft, even when it was obvious to any informed observer that they didn't have the capability to carry them, because the next ship that came through might have the capability.

It is for that reason that we have adopted the policy in the past. Given the vastly reduced role of nuclear weapons in the Navy under current circumstances, we will look at it again. As the Deputy Secretary says, there are still some reasons not simply to cast out the policy automatically.

SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE TREATY

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. You say you have been consulting with other governments on the—concerning the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone treaty. What governments are you consulting with?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Governments that are both in the region and that are—would be potential parties to the protocol.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. You are talking about our allies—the British, the French?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Also countries in the region who may or may not be formal allies but are certainly our friends and have a concern with the matter.

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[3] Hon. Walter Slocombe is the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Are you consulting with the Chinese on this issue?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Rather than go into it in open session, I really would like to repeat the offer to send someone up to you to talk to you on the basis that I don't feel comfortable in the middle of a negotiation or consultation doing it on a public basis.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Do you honestly believe at this point, without getting into any specifics, that our security will be compromised if we sign the nuclear free zone treaty? Is this the problem we are seriously faced with?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. We believe there are U.S. interests which are involved. We want to try to protect those interests, yes.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Seriously? Our security is seriously compromised if we sign this treaty?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I would like——

Mr. DEUTCH. I think we said two or three times, sir, we think there are issues here that we could be more candid with you, tell you what our reasoning is—whether you accept it or not—if we speak to you privately. There are concerns that we have with the—whether the word serious applies or not, we will let you reach your own judgment about.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. These are the issues we discussed 6 years ago that still have not been resolved?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Concerns have not been entirely resolved, no.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. From our Government's point of view or other governments?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Both.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Secretary.

Mr. DEUTCH. Well, I find it difficult to pursue this subject in a hearing, open session, in a way that will be satisfying to you, sir.

I want to say something else. I don't think it is our Department. I hope you are not getting that impression. I think it is a governmentwide concern. We would be happy to come talk to you about it.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I am under the impression that the Department of Defense is probably the leading agency on this very issue. Correct me if I am wrong on this.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Obviously, the nuclear weapons are all in the Department of Defense. Some of the other issues are by no means strictly Defense Department issues. In any event, it is a governmentwide, executive-wide effort. We are not doing the negotiating or the consultation.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. If I were to go to someone in the administration that would get me a final answer to this issue, would I go to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State for a final yes or no? Get out of here? Get lost.

Mr. DEUTCH. Sir, I hope we are not giving that impression. We are not trying to say get out of here, get lost. These are good questions. We are just saying let us talk to you in private about what our concerns are.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I just want to share with you the concerns of the island countries. I feel like I am the lonely member here trying to have some sense of advocacy about the—not only the sentimental but the real sense of concern, the fact that simply these is-

landers have been subjected directly to the horrors, if you will, of nuclear testings by our Government. So the sensitivity goes very, very seriously right to the core. This is not some esoteric or theoretic idea of whether or not nuclear testing has been bad for these people living in this region of the world.

The problem is that France seriously is considering resuming its nuclear testing program. I read recently an article in the *New York Times* of the problems we have with our own testing program in Nevada. There may be serious problems with the water underground there. At 1,000 feet, you might have serious problems with the aquifers there for the 1,000 nuclear detonations we have had in the State of Nevada.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Obviously, the United States does not test in the South Pacific or——

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank God. Atmospherically, underwater, we are doing it underground. I applaud that. I have no objection.

I read in the article in the *New York Times* there are serious problems in Nevada that may affect seriously the water situation in the State of Nevada. But you know I am not going to hold you accountable for that.

I am going to pursue this a little further. I realize perhaps some of the issues are sensitive.

What aggravates me, gentlemen, this has been 6 years. These island countries have been waiting for 20 more years for the problems they have had to deal with.

I have been to Motuari where the French Government conducted nuclear testing—only about 140 nuclear tests in the Pacific. My dream some day is to find a contaminated tuna running around, a fish, a shellfish, and to see the effects of this kind of testing underwater as well as atmospheric.

We know this is the reason we moved our testing program underground in Nevada because of the serious consequences that resulted in our testings in the Pacific. Not only was it done atmospherically but also done in the water. I think you and I know and can appreciate what the islanders appreciate very much.

When is it going to come? How will it be the greatest democracy in the world can be the example? The fact we have already subscribed to a couple of nuclear free zone treaties which has been the basis of—especially in Latin America—certainly can take credit for the fact that no Latin-American countries is taking this because of the nuclear free zone treaty we have been acceding to.

When it comes to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone treaty pending, I am concerned where we have been taking this issue now for over 6 years. And I just think, tell us. Are you with us? Not with us?

The Russians and the Chinese are on board. I am curious. Is it because of the French Government that is giving us a hard time about this? Or what?

I will definitely take up your offer that we do this——

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Good. I am not at all confident we can convince you, but I am confident we can explain our position much more candidly than I feel comfortable doing here.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HAMILTON. Thank you. Mrs. Meyers.

U.S. BOMBER CAPABILITY

Mrs. MEYERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A couple of questions.

Why did you decide to retain the B–52 for nuclear strike missions and take the B–1 completely off nuclear duty? Isn't the B–1 more survivable than the B–52? How much will it cost to retrofit the B–1s for conventional operations?

Mr. DEUTCH. Mrs. Meyers, I think the survivability issue probably goes the other direction between the B–1 and B–52. The B–1 has serious survivability questions, as has been discussed, on ECM—electronic countermeasures. We believe that, for dual use, the required bomber capability was for—inexpensively satisfied by the B–52's carrying cruise missiles as permitted by the START treaty.

The B–1s have a role to play with their conventional capability. We, of course, have a program that I believe is about a $4 billion program over multiple years to make the B–1 fully conventionally capable.

CHINESE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

Mrs. MEYERS. Thank you.

I have a series of questions I would like to ask. Maybe you cannot answer them in an open meeting. Maybe you can. I do not know.

The Chinese have, you know, intercontinental ballistic missiles, of course. I presume that they are the most advanced in terms of not only nuclear warheads but the delivery system among countries that we are concerned about. You can comment on this.

I would like to know if we know which direction these ICBMs are pointed. Do we know where they are? Do we feel that their technology, their delivery system is good enough so that we feel threatened by it? Or are they more of a threat to Russia, other Asian countries? Could you comment on all of that?

Mr. DEUTCH. Briefly, after Russia, China has the only other arsenal which is able to deliver nuclear weapons by ballistic missile to the United States. We try to keep very close track of what that Chinese capability is. We understand it.

Mrs. MEYERS. You would rather not comment further?

Mr. DEUTCH. I would have difficulty going further in public. We will be happy to answer a question for the record or give you a classified response.

PROPOSAL FOR CLOSED SESSION

Mrs. MEYERS. I wonder, Mr. Chairman, perhaps we should think about having a closed session at some time to talk about this, because I think I have gotten the feeling Mr. Deutch feels constrained about answering some questions that he may not in a closed session.

Chairman HAMILTON. Sure. We will be happy to try to arrange such a meeting. I am sure we can get it done before——

Mrs. MEYERS. The time is short.

Mr. DEUTCH. Mrs. Meyers, I do prefer, for laying out of overall policy, to do it in open session. There is no difference in how forth-

coming on the overall policy I would be in closed session and an open session, as I have been here this morning.

It is when we get to specific questions about a negotiation of a treaty or a specific country where I feel constrained. But, generally, we prefer the open session.

But we would be happy to come back also for a closed session to address precise questions like our estimates of a particular nation or what the status is of a particular negotiation.

STATUS OF RUSSIAN DISMANTLEMENT PROGRAM

Mrs. MEYERS. When you were asked the question about actual destruction of missiles and warheads, you commented about the present situation in the Ukraine, but you did not say anything about Russia. Do we know about numbers?

The last time that we had a hearing and asked questions about specific numbers of missiles that had been destroyed in Russia, we got the impression that they were making plans and moving in that direction, but we didn't get any numbers. Did you give numbers today?

Mr. DEUTCH. Certainly I have not given you numbers today.

For all these different categories—warheads, strategic delivery vehicles, bombers, silos—the availability of the data we have, while improving all the time, is different in these different categories.

The progress that the Russians have made in demilitarizing and then destroying these different categories is different. Their record on silos is, I think, generally fairly good. Their record on other matters is at least uncertain. For each one of these different categories, we have a different thorough appreciation of the numerical progress. And we will be happy to provide that for the record.

Mrs. MEYERS. All right. I thank you very much.

[The information follows:]

Since 1991, the Russians have dismantled at least 5,000 warheads. Since September 1990, they have eliminated a total of 630 silos, bombers, and launchers.

SLOW DISBURSEMENT OF NUNN-LUGAR FUNDS

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned a moment ago your interest in nonproliferation—to reduce the number of warheads, weapons dismantlement, and other aspects of the Nunn-Lugar program. Why is it that we have spent so little money? The Congress has appropriated $1.2 billion for weapons dismantlement. $65 million has been spent 3 years into the program—just 5 percent of the money. What are you doing and why are you not doing it more quickly?

Mr. DEUTCH. Mr. Chairman, we believe that the amount of money—and I am now speaking directly from memory—that has been obligated is in excess of $700 million.

Chairman HAMILTON. I don't buy this word "obligated" Mr. Secretary. I want to know what has been spent.

Mr. DEUTCH. I think it is in excess of $100 million now actually disbursed cash out there. I will be glad to get that for you for the record.

Let me say, Mr. Chairman, that I have——

Chairman HAMILTON. At the end of July, it was $65 million.

Mr. DEUTCH. At the end of July $65 million? Actually expended? Let me get you an end of September number. We may both be right, happily.

Chairman HAMILTON. Pardon me. The end of June.

Mr. DEUTCH. Possibly—because this is a sharply increasing curve in terms of actual expenditures.

Let me say first that we have now a thorough briefing that members of your staff or you should have on the precise process we have in place for implementing these programs and spending the money. We have a new organization set up now for a period of months to do it. You should be anticipating and should hold us to a rapidly increasing performance in this area. It is a thorough and complete briefing. I urge you and members of your staff, if you have not had it, to hear that.

Chairman HAMILTON. So you are saying you are going to be spending a lot more money?

Mr. DEUTCH. We are doing so.

Chairman HAMILTON. Why have we been so slow?

Mr. DEUTCH. I want to say something else, sir. That is, during this fiscal 1995 budget process there has been no message that I have gotten more clearly, that has been more vexing to me personally, than this issue of implementation of our cooperative threat reduction efforts under Nunn-Lugar. As you know, we had a very serious time with our appropriators on this subject, and it only has managed to be successful through great effort. So we know how urgent it is to make progress on this issue.

Chairman HAMILTON. I accept all that, but why has it been so slow?

Mr. DEUTCH. I will tell you I believe there are two reasons why it has been slow—three reasons.

One is the construction of the original legislation required us to carry out the assistance under very constrained circumstances—complicated circumstances which involved three parties: the Russian Government or the government of one of the states of the former Soviet Union, the U.S. Government and private industry. In point of fact, there were heavy constraints on that.

Secondly, very importantly, we had the problem of negotiating. What normally happens, sir—I will probably get myself in trouble with this answer—an agreement is signed by——

Chairman HAMILTON. I may get both of us in trouble. Go ahead.

Mr. DEUTCH [continuing]. Agreement is signed by diplomats. What is then left is to negotiate a contract. You now have a contract being negotiated by the U.S. Government and this kind of industrial participation, U.S. industrial participation.

On the Russian side, you have some Russian enterprise where the word "contract" is not familiar and where the whole notion of costing, what is truth in lending, all of our contractual concerns are not familiar. One tries to put that against the Russian enterprise and how they do business. It becomes an extremely lengthy matter to actually negotiate it. But we are making progress on that. That is what I think is important.

Third, I believe we have as a government, executive branch, not organized ourselves sufficiently rapidly to execute this promptly, but I believe that that is now——

Chairman HAMILTON. You have corrected that?

Mr. DEUTCH. I hope so.

Chairman HAMILTON. I understand that speed in disbursing funds is not the sole measure of success. And I also understand that there are other parties involved here, that the Russians have not always held up their end. They have resisted sharing information, as I understand it. They have a very strong concern for secrecy in these matters. But, as you know, many of us in the Congress are exceedingly interested in this. I know you are, too. We want that program to go forward.

PROSPECTS FOR COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN

Now, I wanted to ask you about the Comprehensive Test Ban. We strongly support the goal of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, you say. Why don't you just support the treaty?

Mr. DEUTCH. I accept that change, sir.

Chairman HAMILTON. You accept that change?

Mr. DEUTCH. Yes, sir.

Chairman HAMILTON. You say in your statement, "the President has stated that a comprehensive test ban treaty should be negotiated at the earliest possible time." What does that mean?

Mr. DEUTCH. I think the President—Mr. Chairman, I don't want to stand precisely behind this language. The President certainly wants a comprehensive test ban. We are trying to negotiate one as rapidly as possible.

Chairman HAMILTON. Can you give me some idea of the length of time it will take to negotiate it?

Mr. DEUTCH. It is not on the U.S. side. We have serious problems with other nuclear weapons states. The Chinese are still carrying out a test series now. I think that this is an issue which is very much a matter of coming to agreement among the nuclear weapon states.

Chairman HAMILTON. Do we need more testing?

Mr. DEUTCH. In the near term, how long do you have in mind, sir?

Chairman HAMILTON. You pick the timeframe.

Mr. DEUTCH. The position of the administration, I believe, is that we do not need more testing—or that we can provide for the required safety and reliability, the technical matters, by measures other than testing. That is the administration position.

Chairman HAMILTON. So we don't need more testing. You certainly don't need more testing for new warheads.

Mr. DEUTCH. The Department of Defense has no requirement for new warheads.

Chairman HAMILTON. Yes. The question has always been whether or not you need testing for safety. We have had kind of a phased approach, it seems to me, saying that we want to end the testing, but not right now because we want to do a few more tests for safety purposes.

That was the previous administration's position, but you are telling me that the position of this administration is it is not necessary to have more testing?

Mr. DEUTCH. That is the position of this administration.

Chairman HAMILTON. OK. And getting a Comprehensive Test Ban is a high priority of this administration?

Mr. DEUTCH. That is correct, sir.

SAFETY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARSENAL

Chairman HAMILTON. And you are confident about the safety of our weapons? Are they as safe as they ought to be? Can they be made safer?

Mr. DEUTCH. Mr. Chairman, you catch me personally here in a rather awkward position. Let me explain to you straight why: That is because I have written widely on this subject before I entered government. What I am trying to answer to you now is the position of the administration.

Chairman HAMILTON. I understand.

Mr. DEUTCH. I don't want you later on to find out that John Deutch has, previous to entering this administration, expressed different views on this. I want to tell you straight out that that is the position I am in.

Chairman HAMILTON. I understand.

Mr. DEUTCH. To go back to the question you have now asked me on safety, it is my judgment that all the nuclear weapons we have are adequately safe.

Chairman HAMILTON. OK.

Mr. DEUTCH. I want to stress to you, sir, I used to be responsible for these programs when I was Under Secretary of Energy 20 years ago.

MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR TESTING

Chairman HAMILTON. We are observing a moratorium on testing now, are we not?

Mr. DEUTCH. This country is seeking to negotiate a comprehensive test ban, sir.

Chairman HAMILTON. Yes.

Mr. DEUTCH. We are not testing.

Chairman HAMILTON. We are not testing?

Mr. DEUTCH. That is correct.

Chairman HAMILTON. The President announced in July of 1993 that we would not test up until, I think, September of 1994.

Mr. DEUTCH. That is correct.

Chairman HAMILTON. We are now beyond September of 1994. Have we extended that moratorium on testing?

Mr. DEUTCH. Yes, sir.

Chairman HAMILTON. For how long have we extended it?

Mr. DEUTCH. Considerably, sir.

Chairman HAMILTON. I see. Considerably meaning what? Did we put a date on it?

Mr. DEUTCH. I would have to get you a precise answer for the record.

[The information follows:]

Section 507 of the fiscal year 1993 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act (Public Law 102–377)—the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell Amendment—imposed a moratorium on U.S. nuclear testing from October 2, 1992 (the day the act was signed into law) until July 1, 1993. On July 3, 1993, President Clinton announced his deci-

sion to extend the moratorium on U.S. nuclear testing at least through September 1994.

On March 14, 1994, the President submitted the annual report to Congress on U.S. nuclear testing pursuant to Section 507 of Public Law 102–377. That report communicated the President's decision to extend the existing moratorium on U.S. nuclear testing for an additional year, through September 1995. The White House announcement of the decision was made on March 15, 1994.

The decision to extend the moratorium was based on four factors: the contribution further tests would make to improving the safety and reliability of the U.S. arsenal in preparation for a comprehensive test ban (CTB) treaty; the extent to which China and other states have responded to the U.S. appeal for a global moratorium on testing; progress in the CTB negotiations; and the implications of further U.S. tests on our broader nonproliferation objectives.

The President will decide next year whether to extend the moratorium beyond September 1995, as part of the same annual reporting process, taking into account the same four factors.

Mr. DEUTCH. If you said to me today, Mr. Chairman—if you said today you wanted to have a nuclear test, I think it would be a couple of years before one could happen.

Chairman HAMILTON. Is China the only country in the world now testing?

Mr. DEUTCH. The only country in the world that we know that is testing is China. I believe that France has an ambiguous position on this and won't come to a final determination until after its Presidential election. The only one actively testing is China.

ABM TREATY CLARIFICATION

Chairman HAMILTON. I was also interested in your statement on the ABM Treaty. We are seeking clarifications.

Let me ask a broader question. Are we confident that we can defend against a limited strike under the 1972 ABM Treaty?

Mr. DEUTCH. The United States.

Chairman HAMILTON. Yes.

Mr. DEUTCH. Well, as you know, sir, we are permitted 100 interceptors under the treaty at one location, presumably Grand Forks, North Dakota. The answer is no, that could not protect against all possible, imaginable limited strikes against the United States.

Chairman HAMILTON. Tell me what we are trying to clarify in the ABM Treaty.

Mr. DEUTCH. This is the permissibility of deployable theater ballistic missile systems; that is, systems that are able to knock down incoming theater ballistic missiles such as the Scud systems we saw used by Iraq in the Desert War.

Chairman HAMILTON. What do you mean by clarification? Are you seeking to amend the ABM Treaty?

Mr. DEUTCH. It could be a clarification. At some extreme, it could require a formal amendment to the treaty. We believe we can reach appropriate resolution of this by a clarification. The point is, we want to assure that whatever deployments and testing occur with these theater ballistic missile systems are consistent with the ABM Treaty.

Chairman HAMILTON. We are discussing this with the Russians?

Mr. DEUTCH. That is correct.

Chairman HAMILTON. Was it discussed in the recent meeting between the two Presidents?

Mr. DEUTCH. It must have been mentioned, sir, but I don't have any specific information.

Chairman HAMILTON. What is the next step?

Mr. DEUTCH. Well, there are negotiations going on, as I mentioned earlier, with the Standing Consultative Commission which is the mechanism established under the ABM Treaty to discuss issues that come up. I think we are about to begin a round of discussions on the subject.

Chairman HAMILTON. Hold on just a second.

Gentlemen, I have a Foreign Minister waiting for me. What I would like to do is take about a 5- or 10-minute break. Can you accommodate that?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I have a Political Director waiting for me.

Mr. DEUTCH. I have the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs waiting for me. What do you want us to do?

Chairman HAMILTON. Well, it is close to noon. I apologize for the hectic situation here this morning. That is unavoidable as we come down to the conclusion of a Congress. I have quite a few more questions, which I will submit for the record.[4]

Mr. DEUTCH. We would be glad to come back, sir.

EXTENDED DETERRENCE POLICY

Chairman HAMILTON. Well, I will have you respond to the questions in writing, if you would.

Let me pose one more question. Then we will submit written questions to you and try to meet with you again early next year to perhaps go further.

The Nuclear Posture Review accepts the need for an extended nuclear deterrent in Europe in the form of tactical nuclear weapons. Who comes under the nuclear umbrella in your Nuclear Posture Review and who does not?

Mr. DEUTCH. I don't think the term nuclear umbrella was used in the posture review, but your question goes to a very important point. That is, we have historically had a nuclear policy with NATO that the intent of that policy, the military intent of that policy was to deter massive Soviet attack in Central Europe. The threat of that has gone away.

So an important question is, what is the basis for the presence of any nuclear weapons in NATO now within the framework of the alliance? Of course, it is still true the Russians possess a lot of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, but the original military justification is certainly changed, although the political value of those weapons as a commitment to the alliance is still high.

I believe we have a very long diplomatic road to travel to understand better with NATO what the role is of nuclear weapons in NATO. Indeed, one of the most important outcomes of the Nuclear Posture Review was this notion about how are we going to address nonstrategic nuclear weapons, of which the NATO question is one. And so, unlike the START treaties,——

Chairman HAMILTON. Does this nuclear deterrent extend to Japan? South Korea.

Mr. DEUTCH. I don't understand the question.

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[4] The questions and responses thereto appear in appendix 2.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I think, Mr. Chairman, the United States has always taken the position that nuclear attack on a close ally of the United States would potentially justify a nuclear response by the United States. That doesn't mean it is automatic.

Chairman HAMILTON. What is the difference between a close ally and an ally?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. None.

Chairman HAMILTON. So an ally would be—NATO, certainly?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes.

Chairman HAMILTON. Japan.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes.

Chairman HAMILTON. South Korea.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes.

Chairman HAMILTON. Saudi Arabia.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Saudi Arabia, of course, is not formally an ally.

Chairman HAMILTON. That is correct.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. We have a series of treaties, some of which have a nuclear clause and some do not.

Chairman HAMILTON. The point is, our policy on extended deterrence has not changed?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. No.

Mr. DEUTCH. I tried, Mr. Chairman, to say to you we have to, over time, take another look at this question.

Chairman HAMILTON. I understand.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The distinction is between extended deterrence, which is the assurance that the U.S. deterrent extends to attacks on other countries, and the mechanism by which that extended deterrent would be made good, which has to do with deployment.

Chairman HAMILTON. OK.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. But it is also important to make the point the NPR does not change the pattern of U.S.-overseas deployments for dual-capable aircraft.

Chairman HAMILTON. We thank you for your appearance. The meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:47 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN DEUTCH

I welcome the opportunity to come before you to describe recent changes and decisions on US nuclear weapons posture. As you know, the Department has just completed a total review of our entire nuclear posture which accounts for the numerous important changes the world has experienced over the last half-decade. All aspects of US nuclear posture—force structure, infrastructure, safety and security, command, control, communications and intelligence—were reviewed in depth, with no holds barred and plenty of discussion and debate within this department. I would like to describe the broad outline of the Nuclear Posture Review's results for the Committee, and then to answer the questions posed in your letter of January 26.

Nuclear Posture Review

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) decisions allow us to put our nuclear programs in DoD on a stable footing after several years of rapid change in the international environment and rapid changes in our forces and programs; and at the threshold of a decade of reductions called for by the START I and START II agreements.

The President's National Security Strategy, published this July, described why the United States has a nuclear arsenal:

> "Even with the Cold War over, our nation must maintain military forces that are sufficient to deter diverse threats....
>
> "We will retain strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from acting against our vital interests and to convince it that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile. Therefore we will continue to maintain nuclear forces of sufficient size and capability to hold at risk a broad range of assets valued by such political and military leaders....
>
> "A critical priority for the United States is to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their missile delivery systems."

It is the task of the Department of Defense to calibrate our nuclear posture—our policy, our force structure, our alert rates—to the degree of overt threat we face at any particular time. Accordingly, as a result of the Nuclear Posture Review, we will be making important adjustments in our future plans for the U.S. nuclear posture. These adjustments reflect the changed political situation at the end of the Cold War and the reduced role nuclear weapons play in U.S. security. Indeed, the percentage of the DoD

budget devoted to nuclear weapons programs is lower than it has been at any time for more than thirty years.

These reductions also take place on top of the drastic adjustments and reductions in U.S. (and former Soviet) nuclear forces that have, since the end of the Cold War, already been made and are underway. Since 1988, deployed US strategic weapons have been reduced by 47%, non-strategic weapons by 90%. The levels agreed to in the January 1993 START II agreement will result in total weapons reductions of 79% by 2003 over 1988 levels.

The nuclear forces we are retaining ensure that we have a credible nuclear deterrent -- one that deters attack on the United States and our allies. As long as nuclear weapons remain a factor in international life, this must be our objective.

Today, consistent with the threat situation, our nuclear weapons are not targeted at any country. Should a direct threat emerge which would require us to reactivate targeting, we would hold at risk those assets valued by the leadership of the hostile state. By doing so, we would make clear that, because we were prepared to respond and were capable of doing so, those leaders should never attack us. This is the essence of nuclear deterrence.

Force Adjustments

In terms of concrete changes, there are several important results of the Nuclear Posture Review:

- In general, our force structure will rely on fewer types of nuclear weapons delivery systems.

- We will retain a triad of strategic nuclear forces but we will reduce the strategic nuclear force structure we plan to retain after the START II Treaty is implemented -- for example, reducing the fleet of Trident submarines from 18 to 14, and the number of B-52 bombers from 94 to 66.

- We will eliminate entirely the capability of our surface navy to carry nuclear weapons: aircraft carriers have not carried nuclear bombs for some years, nor have surface ships carried nuclear Tomahawk cruise missiles. But as a result of the NPR, these carriers and surface ships will not retain the capability to carry such weapons.

Just as important as these force structure reductions are some improvements to further strengthen safety, security, and use control over nuclear weapons. The US has

taken since 1988 a number of steps to improve the safety and security of our nuclear weapons. We have removed all nuclear weapons from the custody of US ground and naval forces except SSBNs, and the Army and the Marines--and now, the surface navy--no longer have a nuclear role. Our bombers no longer stand day-to-day alert. In an important development stemming from the January 1994 Summit, US strategic ballistic missiles are no longer targeted against any country. We have reduced the number of nuclear storage locations by over 75%, and the number of personnel with access to weapons or control by 70%.

Safety Improvements

We are highly confident of the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. Nevertheless, the NPR identified several areas for further improvements in US forces' safety, security and use control, and we will pursue those upgrades so that all US nuclear systems will have the most modern safety devices possible. We will accelerate the equipping of our missile submarines with coded locking devices, and we will upgrade the locking devices on our bombers and silo-based missiles.

Alert Posture

We have taken numerous recent actions that have reduced out alert posture. Our command post structure has been reduced significantly and the operations tempo of our world-wide airborne command post system has been significantly reduced since the Cold War. A dramatic change has been the new mission for the National Airborne Operations Center, previously only used in a nuclear role, is now available to the Federal Emergency Management Agency for use in civil disasters. Bombers have not been on day-to-day alert since President Bush's Nuclear Initiative in September 1991. ICBMs will continue to be targeted on broad ocean areas, but will remain manned and on alert day-to-day. SSBNs will not be targeted at any country.

These adjustments reflect the continuing profound changes in the world, and our hopes for a world where nuclear weapons play a smaller role for all, as they do for us.

START I and START II

We kept in mind as we conducted the NPR that START I has not yet entered into force, nor has START II been ratified. For this reason, and because of the uncertain future of the rapid political and economic change still underway in the former Soviet Union, we made two judgments in the NPR:

- First, we concluded that deeper unilateral reductions beyond those we made in the NPR would be imprudent at this time.

- Second, we took several actions to ensure that we could reconstitute our forces as the decade went along, if we needed to. For example, we determined we would retain the Triad as a hedge against system failure of a leg of the triad, either because of technical failure of a delivery platform or warhead, or technological breakthroughs by potential adversaries.

On the other hand, if all goes as planned with the implementation of START I and START II, nothing in the NPR precludes further reductions in the future. We therefore believe that we have struck a prudent balance in the NPR between leading the way to a safer world and hedging against the unexpected.

Cooperative Threat Reduction

We are trying to hasten the START implementation process through, among other things, our "Nunn-Lugar" Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs with Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. While the CTR program started out slowly, the pace of implementation increased dramatically over the past year. The CTR obligation rate which was at $70 million in January 1994 has increased six-fold to over $425 million by September 1994. Over 7,000 items of assistance have been delivered. Today, $897 million is committed in 38 signed project implementing agreements with the FSU states; 30 of these agreements were signed since June last year.

Summit Initiatives

We are making adjustments in the US nuclear posture unilaterally, in response to our own assessment of our military needs. They are consistent with, but are not required by, any new arms control agreements. We hope, however, that they provide an occasion for Russia to undertake a comparable review, and to make similar adjustments in its strategic force plans, non-strategic force plans, and ways of ensuring safety, security, and use control. Last week President Yeltsin came to Washington to meet with President Clinton, and they had the opportunity to discuss these adjustments, which are made possible in important measure by our new security relationship with Russia -- which Dr. Perry has referred to as a "Pragmatic Partnership."

At last week's Summit, the Presidents made important progress on a number of arms control issues, and in fact, took steps down the road of further reductions and increased cooperation on nuclear issues. The Presidents confirmed their intention to seek early ratification of the START II Treaty, once the START I treaty enters into force, and expressed their desire to exchange START II instruments of ratification at the next US-Russia Summit meeting. The Presidents also instructed their experts to intensify

their dialogue to compare conceptual approaches and to develop concrete steps to adapt the nuclear forces and practices on both sides to the changed international security environment, including the possibility, after ratification of START II , of further reductions of, and limitations on , remaining nuclear forces.

Early Deactivation

In an important new development, the Presidents agreed that, once the START II Treaty is ratified, the United States and Russia will proceed to deactivate all strategic nuclear delivery systems to be reduced under START II by removing their nuclear warheads or taking other steps to remove them from combat status. This initiative reinforces the NPR's themes of rapid implementation of existing arms control agreements, moving away from Cold War risks of accidental or unauthorized launch, and strengthening the safety and security of warhead storage.

Transparency and Data Exchange

Another important Summit initiative was the prospect for confidence-building and transparency measures in the area of nuclear forces. At the next meeting of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, the two nations will exchange detailed information on aggregate stockpiles of nuclear warheads, on stocks of fissile materials and on their safety and security. The sides will develop a process for exchanging this information on a regular basis.

Nuclear Proliferation

The Nuclear Posture Review highlighted the importance of non-proliferation in US security policy. The growing security threats posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles is at the top of DoD's list of security priorities. Dr. Ashton Carter, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, is responsible for formulation and overseeing the implementation of DoD's counterproliferation initiative. This effort is actively coordinated with the Joint Staff and the Acquisition community.

The Committee, in its January 26 letter, raised six sets of questions which I would like now to address based on what we learned and decided in the NPR.

- 1. Strategy and 2. Targeting

The nature of the threat today is different than the one we faced during the Cold War. The Review confirmed that, with the demise of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, nuclear weapons will play a changed role in our national security strategy. But there are problems we must deal with as we reshape our nuclear posture.

With regard to Russia, first we must take into account the small but real danger that reform in Russia might fail and a new government arise hostile to the United States, still armed with 25,000 nuclear weapons. This process requires us to maintain deterrence as we reduce our strategic forces and to carry out our reductions in concert with reductions in the FSU. Second, because of instabilities attendant to the drastic social, political and economic reforms underway in Russia and the other new states, we must be especially concerned with the security of nuclear components and materials on the territory of the former Soviet Union.

We are also concerned about the potential threats posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction around the world

Nuclear deterrence continues to be fundamental to our national security objectives. We have maintained both strategic forces and non-strategic nuclear forces for the purpose of deterrence.

Our nuclear posture has already changed significantly in recognition of the end of the Cold War. For instance, the U.S. and Russia agreed that as of May 30th of this year, our respective nuclear forces would not be targeted on a day-to-day basis Both the U.S. command post structure and the operations tempo of the world-wide airborne post system have been significantly reduced since the end of the Cold War. Bombers are not on day-to-day alert. SSBNs have a reduced number of boats at sea day-to-day.

But deterrence is ensured by having a survivable capability to hold at risk what potentially hostile leaders value, and we will maintain that capability. We do not target any nation today. But we must be prepared for the possible emergence of a hostile government in Russia or failure of the arms control process in the FSU. We will also retain the capability to hold at risk that which is valued by other potentially hostile powers, in order to deter those countries.

- 3. Nuclear Safety

We are highly confident of the safety, security, and reliability of the US nuclear stockpile. Nevertheless, as I noted earlier, the NPR identified several areas for further

improvements in US forces' safety, security and use control, and we will pursue those upgrades so that all US nuclear systems will have the most modern safety devices possible. The U.S. nuclear weapon stockpile is currently safe and reliable. In order to maintain the stockpile, over the next few years, we will need to further develop other safeguard programs aimed at maintaining confidence in the safety and reliability of our weapons.

By increased effort in these areas, we believe we can maintain confidence in our nuclear arsenal without nuclear testing. Retiring older weapon systems, changing operating procedures, and evaluating the safety and reliability of some weapon and delivery systems are also some of the things we can do. The Department of Energy can provide additional details regarding their part of the stockpile stewardship program.

- 4. Nuclear Weapons Force Planning and Arms Control

START I and START II Implementation

As we made adjustments in our future plans for the U.S. nuclear posture as a result of the NPR, uppermost in our minds was the fact that the states of the former Soviet Union are yet in the early stages of implementing the agreed reductions called for by the START I and II agreements. Although all five parties to the START I Treaty have ratified it, the Treaty has not yet entered into force. The last hurdle to entry into force is Ukraine's accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state. The Russian parliament made NPT accession a condition for instruments of ratification to be exchanged and thus for entry into force to occur. Ukrainian President Kuchma has stated that he plans to submit NPT to the Ukrainian parliament in October of this year. However, even though START I is not officially in force, all parties have been deactivating strategic delivery systems that would be eliminated under the Treaty. For example, the United States has removed all of the warheads from its ballistic missiles whose launchers are scheduled for elimination under START I. Similar warhead removals are occurring in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.

Since START II cannot enter into force before START I does, neither the United States nor Russia has yet acted to ratify START II.

As I noted earlier, during the recent summit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that, once the START II Treaty is ratified, the United States and Russia will proceed to deactivate all strategic nuclear delivery systems to be reduced under START II by removing their nuclear warheads or taking other steps to remove them from combat status. In addition, as I noted earlier, the Presidents also instructed their experts to intensify their dialogue to compare conceptual approaches and to develop

concrete steps to adapt the nuclear forces and practices on both sides to the changed international security environment, including the possibility, after ratification of START II , of further reductions of, and limitations on , remaining nuclear forces. ssame

Comprehensive Test Ban

We strongly support the goal of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and have been actively negotiating to this end. While we cannot guarantee that at CTB will be achieved by a date certain, we hope that one can be concluded by 1996 in accordance with the Congressional mandate in the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell law. Given the complexity of a CTB, we do not believe there should be any linkage between it and extending the NPT indefinitely, which must and should occur next spring.

The President has stated that a comprehensive test ban treaty should be negotiated at the earliest possible time -- the time necessary, negotiating diligently and in good faith, to write a sound treaty. Beyond that, setting a specific target date would not be useful, and could be counterproductive.

ABM Treaty and Ballistic Missile Defense

The Presidents discussed the ABM treaty at the Summit. President Clinton unequivocally supports the ABM Treaty as a central element of strategic stability with Russia. In response to the growing threat of proliferation of missiles and of weapons of mass destruction they could carry, we have increased our emphasis on highly effective theater ballistic missile defense to protect forward deployed U.S. forces, U.S. allies and friends. This in turn has made it necessary to make clear the distinction between ABM systems for countering strategic ballistic missiles (which are strictly limited by the ABM Treaty) and theater missile defense systems (which are not). We are pursuing agreement in the Standing Consultative Commission -- the Treaty's implementing body -- to clarify the demarcation between ABM and non-ABM systems, which we have acknowledged as ambiguous in the existing Treaty.

We are seeking the aforementioned clarification in order to strengthen the Treaty in the face of changed circumstances and enhanced technical capabilities, and we continue to believe that highly effective theater missile defense and a strong ABM Treaty are compatible goals. And, while I cannot enter into detail on the negotiations in the SCC, I believe they have demonstrated there is general agreement among the parties regarding the extent of the theater missile threat and the need to clarify the Treaty.

Noting the recent progress made on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation and multilateralization of the ABM Treaty, the Presidents at the Summit instructed their respective delegations, working with the other participating states, to complete agreement on remaining issues in the shortest possible time. The Presidents also agree b oth the US and Russia have an interest in developing and fielding effective theater missile defense systems on a cooperative basis.

- 5. Nuclear Proliferation

A centerpiece of the Administration's nonproliferation policy is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. DoD strongly supports the Administration initiative to secure the indefinite, unconditional extension of the NPT. We view such an extension as the best means to eliminate uncertainty about the future of nuclear non-proliferation efforts and to ensure that efforts to reduce nuclear arsenals will continue to be successful.

As part of the USG strategy to ensure a successful extension decision in 1995, the USG has begun preliminary discussions on an internationally-verifiable cut-off convention on fissile material for weapons purposes in the Conference on Disarmament. Toward this end, in June we agreed with Russia that if they dismantled their three remaining military plutonium production reactors, we would help provide alternative power sources.

Additionally, we strongly support the goal of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and have been actively negotiating to this end.

With regard to export controls, clearly, limiting the spread of nuclear weapons technology is an issue of the utmost importance to the Department of Defense. Unlike many other national security issues, this concern has not diminished with the end of the Cold War. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear, poses a grave and increasing military threat which must be countered on a number of fronts, one of which is technology security, or export controls.

To make informed judgments on export controls, U.S. officials need the very best intelligence on the proliferation-relevant activities of nations of concern and their procurement patterns. Second, to be effective, export controls should, to the extent possible, be broadly multilateral. DoD has been active on both these fronts. With regard to intelligence on activities and procurement, DoD, as part of its Counterproliferation Initiative, is engaged in an on-going dialogue with the Intelligence Community regarding how better to support our licensing efforts.

DoD is also an active supporter of Administration initiatives to multilateralize unilateral USG export controls. Although controls on some items have been liberalized (e.g., computers), we believe this liberalization is consistent with our national security and counterproliferation objectives. By liberalizing licensing requirements on items that are available throughout the world, we can focus our export control efforts on denying transfers of items and technologies of key significance to the development of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

- 6. Nuclear Weapons and Naval Vessels

The Committee also asked about the status of US policy on the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ). Secretary Christopher made a commitment to have the question of USG adherence to the protocols of the SPNFZ reviewed when he spoke to ASEAN in the summer of 1993. We are conducting extensive discussions on this subject with US allies, inside the U.S. government and especially within the Department of Defense.

While the USG has not signed the SPNFZ protocols, we have assured South Pacific nations that our behavior in the region will not be inconsistent with them.

The United States maintains a long-standing policy of neither confirming nor denying (NCND) the presence or absence of nuclear weapons at any general or specific location, including aboard any U.S. military station, ship, vehicle, or aircraft. Since 1992, we have also stated "it is general U.S. policy not to deploy nuclear weapons aboard surface ships, attack submarines and naval aircraft. However, we do not discuss the presence or absence of nuclear weapons aboard specific ships, submarines, or aircraft." As a result of NPR recommendations, the President decided to eliminate the option to deploy nuclear bombs with dual-capable aircraft on aircraft carriers and to eliminate the option to deploy TLAM/N capability from surface combatants, while retaining the option to deploy TLAM/N on SSNs. In light of those NPR decisions, we will review our NCND policy and see if any changes are appropriate.

Conclusion

I look forward to the Committee's questions on these and other nuclear weapons issues. Thank you.

Nuclear Posture Review

Why We Have Nuclear Weapons

"Even with the Cold War over, our nation must maintain military forces that are sufficient to deter diverse threats."

"We will retain strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from acting against our vital interests and to convince it that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile. Therefore we will continue to maintain nuclear forces of sufficient size and capability to hold at risk a broad range of assets valued by such political and military leaders."

"A critical priority for the United States is to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their missile delivery systems."

President William J. Clinton
NSS July 1994

Why Review US Nuclear Posture?

- First comprehensive review in 15 years
- New security environment
  - Reduction in conventional threat in Europe
  - Threat posed by Russia reduced . . . different
  - Continuing political/economic reform in FSU
  - Regional threats more important than before
- DoD budget constraints
- Substantial reductions underway and planned
  - Stock-taking needed
  - Need to rebalance infrastructure, industrial and technology bases
  - Need to maintain quality people

Effects of the Changing Security Environment

Security Environment	Impact	Implications
End of Cold War	• Conventional threat from FSU especially to Europe decreases • Improving relationship with Russia • Uncertainty in FSU political and economic changes • Continuing large Russian nuclear arsenal • Increased prevalence of regional conflicts	• Smaller role for nuclear weapons in US security strategy • Focus on threat reduction in FSU • Explore further relaxation in alert posture • Explore further force reductions • Improve storage and security • Nuclear deterrence still important; responsible stewardship of enduring arsenal without underground nuclear tests • Retain roughly equivalent forces • Maintain alliance commitments • Maintain conventional forces capability to win two MRCs (BUR)
Growing WMD Proliferation	• US and Allies face WMD threat • FSU "loose" nukes	• Reinforce policies to prevent proliferation • Develop conventional capabilities to deter, defeat, defend against WMD proliferation on the battlefield
Regional Engagement	• Regional competitors seek high leverage to offset US conventional forces	

Overview

- ❒ NPR Process
- ❒ Perspective
- ❒ Strategic Forces
- ❒ Non-Strategic Forces
- ❒ C3I
- ❒ Infrastructure
- ❒ Safety, Security, and Use Control
- ❒ Initiatives
- ❒ Summary

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Part I:
NPR Process


NPR Structure
US Security Strategy
The Role of Nuclear Weapons in US Security
Counterproliferation Policy
Deterrence Strategy
Threat Reduction Policy
Contingencies, Missions, and Capabilities
Declaratory Policy
Force Structure and Infrastructure
Plans, Operations, and C3
Safety, Security, and Use Control

DoD-Wide Collaborative Effort



Part II: Perspective

A Historical Perspective

- Significant reductions in US nuclear forces are underway
  - Weapons (since 1988)
    - Total active stockpile reduced by 59%
    - Strategic warheads reduced by 47%
    - Non-strategic nuclear force warheads reduced by 90%
    - No nuclear weapons remain in the custody of US ground forces
  - Operations
    - Strategic bombers taken off day-to-day alert
    - ICBMs and SLBMs detargeted
    - More SSBNs patrolling on "modified alert" rather than "alert"
    - Naval NSNF no longer routinely deployed at sea
    - Reduced airborne command and control operations tempo
  - Programmatic (1989-Present)

Program Terminations

- Small ICBM
- Peacekeeper Rail Garrison
- Lance Follow-on
- New Artillery Fired Atomic Projectile
- Tactical Air to Surface Missile
- Short Range Attack Missile II

Program Truncations

- Peacekeeper
- B-2
- B-1 Nuclear Role
- Advanced Cruise Missile
- W-88

Systems Retired; No Replacement

- Artillery Fired Atomic Projectile
- FB-111
- Minuteman II
- Lance
- Short Range Attack Missile-A
- Nuclear Depth Bomb
- C-3 SSBN

A Historical Perspective








Adjusted Nuclear Posture
Counterproliferation
Threat Reduction
Stability
Nuclear Forces
• Changed role
• Smaller
• Safer
Stewardship
(Without Nuclear Testing)
Hedge
Declaratory Policy
Alliance Commitments
Direct Deterrence

Part III:
Strategic Forces

Force Structure Paths:
Protecting Options In An Uncertain World



Military Requirement for US Strategic Nuclear Forces

- Force plans for 2003:
  - Based on projected military requirements
  - Assume implementation of START I and START II
- Capabilities of Former Soviet Union (FSU) remain primary concern
  - Do not target Russia (or anyone else) today, *but* . . .
  - Must be prepared for possible emergence of hostile government in Russia or failure of arms control process in the FSU

Platform Attributes

- Submarines
  - Survivable ➡ Stability
- Bombers
  - Survivable (when on alert) ➡ Stability
  - Hedge against catastrophic failure of SSBN leg
  - Dual capable--can help in conventional contingencies
- ICBMs
  - Significant upload hedge
  - Ability to strike selectively

Post-START II Force Structure 2003

- SSBNs
  - 14 SSBNs (retire 4)
  - All with D-5 missiles
  - Retain 2 bases (Kings Bay and Bangor)
- Bombers
  - 66 B-52s (28 fewer)
  - Non-nuclear role for B-1
  - No more than 20 B-2s required for nuclear mission
- ICBMs
  - Maintain three wings of Minuteman ICBMs (500/450 missiles)

Options Reviewed to Achieve Faster/Deeper Reductions

- Accelerate implementation of START I/II
  - Seek accelerated FSU warhead removals to START I levels
  - Early deactivation/acceleration of START II implementation with US assistance
- Negotiate new agreement for faster and deeper reductions
- Explore sufficiency of US forces below START II levels....Unilateral reduction

Warhead Upload Hedge

- Must preserve options for uploading/reconstituting US nuclear forces should . . .
  - Political relations with Russia change for the worse
  - START I and START II not be fully implemented
- NPR strategic force capable of providing necessary hedge through
  - START II declaratory RV loading
  - Where possible in near term, maintenance of platforms

Part IV: Non-Strategic Forces

Non-Strategic Nuclear Force Structure

- USAF Dual Capable Aircraft (DCA)
  - Maintain Alliance commitment
  - Maintain current strength in CONUS and Europe
- USN Carrier DCA and nuclear TOMAHAWK (TLAM/N)
  - Eliminate carrier and surface ship nuclear weapons capability
  - Maintain capability to deploy TLAM/N on SSNs

Part V:
Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I)

Post-Cold War C3I and Operations

- Cold War nuclear force posture modified
  - Bombers off alert
  - More SSBNs patrolling on "Modified-Alert" rather than "Alert"
  - ICBMs and SLBMs detargeted
  - Reduced command post structure
  - Reduced Airborne Command & Control Ops Tempo (NEACP, TACAMO, ABNCP)
- Nevertheless, to maintain deterrence, must carry out key missions
  - Early warning
  - Threat assessment
  - Connectivity to national leadership
  - Message dissemination
  - Safe, secure force management

Strategic C3I Requirements

- ❒ Continue adequate funding of critical programs
- ❒ Correct existing/projected communication system and tactical warning/attack assessment deficiencies
- ❒ Support intelligence systems which provide timely information and threat characterization warning indicators

Part VI: Infrastructure

Infrastructure Requirements

- ❒ Replace guidance system and re-motor Minuteman III
- ❒ Continue D-5 production past 1995 to maintain missile industrial base
- ❒ Fund sustainment of guidance systems and maintain reentry vehicle industrial base
- ❒ No specific bomber infrastructure funding necessary for nuclear mission

Infrastructure Requirements
(Cont)

- DoD requirements to DOE
  - Maintain nuclear weapon capability (without underground nuclear testing or fissile material production)
    - Develop stockpile surveillance engineering base
    - Demonstrate capability to refabricate and certify weapon types in enduring stockpile
    - Maintain capability to design, fabricate, and certify new warheads
    - Maintain science and technology base
  - Ensure tritium availability
  - No new-design nuclear warhead production

Part VII:
Safety, Security, and Use Control

US Nuclear Safety, Security, and Use Control

- No nuclear weapons remain in the custody of US ground forces
- Naval NSNF no longer deployed at sea
- Strategic bombers taken off day-to-day alert
- Since 1988, total active stockpile reduced by 59% (79% by 2003)
  - Strategic warheads reduced by 47% (71% by 2003)
  - NSNF warheads cut by 90%
    - NATO stockpile cut by 91%
- Storage locations reduced by over 75%
- Personnel with access to weapons or control cut by 70%

US Nuclear Safety, Security, and Use Control Recommendations

- ❒ Upgrade coded control device (CCD) components on the B-52 and Minuteman III
- ❒ Retire Minuteman W-62 warhead
- ❒ Optimize number of accident/incident teams
- ❒ Continue implementation of FARR recommendations by seeking alternatives for those recommendations that test moratorium may preclude
- ❒ Complete Trident CCD in 1997 (means system level coded control devices or PALs will be on all US nuclear weapons by 1997)
- ❒ Implement a regular and realistic nuclear procedures exercise program with participation by senior DoD civilian and military leadership

Part VIII: Initiatives

Counterproliferation Initiatives

- Develop effective theater defenses against ballistic missile and air-breathing threats
- Enhance conventional capabilities to counter the proliferation threat and support funding for principal Deutch Committee report recommendations
  - Improved real-time detection and characterization of BW/CW agents
  - Underground structures detection and characterization
  - Hard underground target defeat, including advanced non-nuclear weapons producing low collateral damage
- Provide DoD capabilities in support of UN and other international non-proliferation efforts
- Fully implement nuclear arms control agreements and support NPT, BWC, and CWC
- Continue assistance to FSU to enhance safety and security of nuclear weapons

Initiatives Considered for Improving Russian Safety, Security, and Use Control

Forces

- ❒ Further NSNF reductions
- ❒ Accelerating removal of warheads down to START II levels
- ❒ Further SNF reductions beyond START II
- ❒ Removing warheads from all ICBMs

Operational Practices

- ❒ Cooperative warning and verification of alert status
- ❒ Delaying ICBM/SLBM launch ability

Weapon Stockpile

- ❒ Stockpile data exchange
- ❒ Transparency/acceleration of warhead dismantlement
- ❒ Stockpile inventory cap
- ❒ Storing weapons/material under international custody

Part IX: Summary

Conclusions

- Post-Cold War environment requires nuclear deterrent
  - Rebalanced Triad
  - START II levels remain in US interest until START I implementation complete, Russia nears START II levels, and we're confident of Russia's future
- Major reductions and cost savings underway
  - US forces will be smaller, safer, more secure and maintained at lower alert rates
  - Reduce infrastructure, but maintain people and technical base
- US Nuclear Posture must help shape future
  - Create world in which role of nuclear weapons reduced
  - Stem proliferation
  - Preserve options if reform fails in Russia
  - Maintain good stewardship
- Difficult but vital challenge for US Posture is to both <u>lead</u> and <u>hedge</u>

Main Results of the NPR (Cont)

- Safety, Security, and Use Control
  - Equip all US nuclear weapons systems, including submarines, with coded control devices or PAL by 1997
  - Upgrade coded control locking devices on Minuteman III ICBMs and B-52 bombers
  - Conduct regular NCA procedural exercises
- Infrastructure
  - Stockpile stewardship "customer plan" for DoE
  - Sustain ballistic missile industrial base by Minuteman III sustainment and D-5 production
  - Sustain reentry vehicle and guidance system industrial base
- Command, Control, Communications, & Intelligence and Operations
  - Continue adjustments to post-Cold War alert/operational requirements
  - Support selected C3I programs for assured NCA survivability and continuity
- Threat Reduction and Proliferation
  - Support Cooperative Threat Reduction program to promote steps to prevent unauthorized/accidental use or diversion of weapons or materials from/within the FSU
  - Support counterproliferation initiative to provide conventional responses to use of WMD in regional conflict

Main Results of the NPR

- Strategic Forces
  - No more than 20 B-2 bombers required for nuclear role
  - Reduce B-52 bomber force (94 to 66)
  - Reduce Trident submarine fleet size from 18 to 14; but modernize SLBM force for very long service life by equipping all submarines with D-5 missiles
  - Maintain single warhead Minuteman III ICBMs (500/450)
  - Maintain flexibility to reduce further or reconstitute
- Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces
  - Maintain European NSNF commitment at current level (less than 10% of Cold War level)
  - Eliminate nuclear weapons capability from US Navy surface ships
    - Eliminate nuclear DCA capability from aircraft carriers
    - Eliminate nuclear cruise missile capability from surface combatants
  - Retain nuclear cruise missile capability on submarines
  - Retain land-based dual-capable nuclear aircraft capability

APPENDIX 1

One Hundred Third Congress

Congress of the United States

Committee on Foreign Affairs

House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

January 26, 1994

The Honorable Les Aspin
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Committee on Foreign Affairs wants to hold a hearing early this session on U.S. policy on nuclear weapons.

Recent changes in the world necessitate a full-scale re-examination of the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. foreign and defense policy. I would like to request the testimony of an interagency panel of witnesses, from the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency on U.S. policy.

Witnesses will be expected to describe the Administration's policy on nuclear weapons, the justification and rationale for continuing these weapons in the U.S. arsenal, and long-range plans regarding their role, use and disposition. In addition, I would like witnesses specifically to address questions in the following areas:

1. U.S. nuclear strategy – What is the nature of the nuclear threat today? What is the role of nuclear deterrence, and the role of the triad in nuclear deterrence? How should U.S. policy on deterrence change?

2. Nuclear targeting – What do you target with nuclear weapons today? What is the current readiness and alert status of U.S. nuclear forces, and how should that change?

3. Nuclear safety – How confident are you of the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal? What alternatives exist to improve safety and stockpile reliability in the absence of resumed nuclear testing?

4. Nuclear weapons force planning and arms control – What is the status of the implementation of START I and II, and negotiations on further reductions in nuclear arms? What is your timeline on achieving a comprehensive test ban treaty? What is your policy on the ABM Treaty and Ballistic Missile Defense systems?

5. Nuclear proliferation -- Where is non-proliferation on your list of security priorities? Is non-proliferation at the top of your list, and who is responsible for policy development, implementation and coordination? What are your goals and strategy for the upcoming 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference? Why is the implementation of the Nunn-Lugar program in the former Soviet Union proceeding so slowly, and what can be done to speed up the process of safe weapons dismantlement? What is your policy on nuclear and dual-use export controls?

6. Nuclear Weapons and Naval Vessels -- What is your policy on whether the U.S. should support the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone? What is the utility today of the Neither Confirm Nor Deny policy regarding the presence of nuclear weapons on U.S. Navy vessels?

The Foreign Affairs Committee will need a clear idea of this Administration's policy on nuclear weapons because the Committee will be dealing in 1995 with legislation in the area of nuclear nonproliferation and export controls. The Committee also has a strong interest in working with you in revising U.S. nuclear policy, and in reviewing arms control plans, policies, and agreements.

I appreciate your attention to this request and I look forward to discussing the timing of this hearing with you soon. Please feel free to contact Mike Van Dusen, Chris Kojm or Dave Barton of my staff (202-225-5021) regarding specific questions that you may have.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Lee H. Hamilton
Chairman

LHH/DB:cd

APPENDIX 2

Question #1: **What does the U.S. target today with our nuclear weapons?**

- **How has U.S. targeting changed since the end of the Cold War?**
- **How are you carrying out the commitment Clinton and Yeltsin made at their January 1994 summit meeting to no longer target each others country?**
  - **Are we still targeting Russia?**
  - **If not, what do we target?**
- **How quickly can U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons be re-targeted?**

In response to the changes in Europe, including the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the breakup of the Soviet Union, targeting guidance has been modified already to reflect the current political and military realities. Today, consistent with the threat situation, our nuclear weapons are not targeted at any country. Should a direct threat emerge which would require us to reactivate targeting, we would hold at risk those assets valued by the leadership of the hostile state. By doing so, we would make clear that, because we were prepared to respond and were capable of doing so, those leaders should never attack us. This is the essence of nuclear deterrence.

Even prior to the end of the Cold War, the target base utilized to support the SIOP had been modified and reduced to reflect the changing realities of the potential nuclear threat to the U.S. and its allies. The size of our nuclear forces has also been reduced. The Nuclear Posture Review carefully reviewed the changed environment, assessed the military modifications already in place, and made recommendations on further modifications to force structure and targeting guidance. These changes will continue the concepts of deterrence.

The actions to implement the January 1994 Clinton-Yeltsin detargeting initiative were completed by May 30, 1994. ICBMs and SLBMs are capable of being launched against one of several targets or sets of targets stored in weapon system computers. Historically, a target setting associated with actual war plans has been the routine alert assignment of US missile systems. Detargeting involves changing weapon systems control settings so that, on a day-to-day basis, no country is targeted by US strategic forces. We understand the detargeting measures of Russia are comparable. For three of the four US strategic missiles systems -- the Trident I, Trident II, and Peacekeeper -- the missiles will contain no targeting information. As a safeguard, the first priority target assignments in launch control equipment available for insertion into the missiles are aim points in ocean areas. The older technology Minuteman III missile computers, which require a constant alignment reference, are set to ocean area targets. If necessary, both US and Russian nuclear weapons could be retargeted quickly.

<u>Question #2:</u> **What are the circumstances today that would cause the U.S. to target a country with nuclear weapons?**

- **In your recommended force levels, do you have a lot more weapons than realistic targets?**

Today, consistent with the threat situation, our nuclear weapons are not targeted at any country. Should a direct threat emerge which would require us to reactivate targeting, we would hold at risk those assets valued by the leadership of the hostile state. By doing so, we would make clear that, because we were prepared to respond and were capable of doing so, those leaders should never attack us. This is the essence of nuclear deterrence.

In the NPR-recommended START II force levels, the U.S. does <u>not</u> have more weapons than realistic targets; indeed, force levels were reviewed to ensure that the US maintains the minimum force needed to carry out our strategy of deterrence.

<u>Question #3:</u> **What has changed regarding the alert status of U.S. and Russian nuclear forces?**

- **What changes does your posture review recommend in the readiness and alert status of U.S. nuclear forces?**

A number of significant changes in US nuclear force posture had already been made prior to the NPR's conclusion. Strategic bombers were taken off day-to-day alert status; they must generate over a period of time to an alert status. U.S. and Russian SLBMs and ICBMs remain on a day-to-day alert status, but are targeted toward broad ocean areas. More US SSBNs patrol on "modified alert" rather than "alert." The US had reduced its command post structure, and reduced the operational tempo.

As a result of the Bush Presidential Nuclear Initiative in 1991, there are no US non-strategic nuclear weapons on surface ships and SSNs on a day-to-day basis. The only U.S. nuclear weapons deployed outside the US (besides those on SSBNs) are in Europe.

The Nuclear Posture Review looked at the readiness and alert status changes already in effect and decided to maintain the current posture for strategic nuclear forces while reducing the force size. For non-strategic nuclear forces, the NPR decision was made to remove the capability to deploy nuclear weapons on surface ships, including the ability to deploy nuclear weapons from naval dual capable aircraft, while retaining the capability to deploy nuclear Tomahawks (TLAM-Ns) on SSNs if necessary.

Question #4: **Which U.S. nuclear forces continue to be modernized?**

- **Is the Administration standing by its commitment to seek only continued modernization of the Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile?**

No new weapons systems are planned. DoD plans to pursue only the remotoring and Guidance Replacement Program Phase I for Minuteman III ICBMs and sufficient production of Trident II D-5 missiles to support a 14 D-5 SSBN fleet and an appropriate test program.

Question #5: **The Nuclear Posture Review does not recommend further negotiations to reduce strategic nuclear forces. The NPR states that START I and START II reductions should be implemented before opening further negotiations with Russia. However, the Clinton-Yeltsin summit stated the "possibility, after ratification of START II, of further reductions of, and limitations on, remaining nuclear forces."**

At what point are you prepared to open another round of arms reduction talks with Russia?

The force structure recommended by the NPR gives us the flexibility to make further reductions in strategic nuclear forces if we choose to do so, but the NPR did not determine whether or when negotiated reductions should occur. There has been no U.S. decision regarding additional strategic arms reduction talks, but this issue is under review. However, it is important that the United States continue to emphasize ratification and entry into force of START II.

Is it in the national interest of the United States to negotiate further reductions immediately after START II ratification?

There has been no U.S. decision regarding this issue but it is under review. It is important to repeat, however, that our primary focus regarding START is to achieve the ratification and entry-into-force of START II.

Why doesn't the Nuclear Posture Review lay out any plan for nuclear weapons reductions beyond START II?

The purpose of the NPR was to focus on the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security strategy and on the force structure, infrastructure, C3, operations, and safety and security needed to support that role. While the NPR did look at a variety of arms control issues, it did not propose any plan for further reductions. The issue of possible reductions beyond START II is being considered in other fora of the interagency process.

How low are we willing to go on nuclear weapons with Russia?

There has been no U.S. decision regarding what level, if any, to which the United States and Russia should negotiate reductions in their deployed strategic nuclear warheads below the START II level of 3500. Further negotiated warhead reductions is among several issues currently under review. The NPR did, nonetheless, result in decisions to reduce the strategic nuclear force structure that the U.S. plans to retain after the START II Treaty is implemented.

Question #6: Last year, President Clinton committed the U.S. at the UN to working for "irreversible disarmament." How does the Nuclear Posture Review operationalize this Presidential commitment? What nuclear force levels do you set out in your posture review for the coming decade, and how do they square with the President's commitment for "irreversible disarmament?"

The purpose of the NPR was to examine the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in a changed international security environment and to assess the force structure, infrastructure, C3, operations, and safety and security needed to support that role. However, at their recent summit meeting, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin directed a joint working group to pursue measures for improving confidence in and for increasing the transparency and irreversibility of the process of reducing nuclear weapons. This group is scheduled to begin its work by March, 1995 and to report on its progress at the next summit.

The NPR strategic nuclear force structure is projected to the year 2003 and is premised on START II being in force. It includes 14 Trident submarines carrying D-5 missiles, 450-500 Minuteman III missiles carrying single warheads, 66 B-52 bombers, and 20 B-2 bombers. This force will have over 120 fewer ballistic missiles and bombers than previously planned. Furthermore, it provides us with the flexibility to make further reductions in strategic nuclear forces if we choose to do so.

<u>Question #7:</u> **What message does the Nuclear Posture Review send to states which have nuclear weapons ambitions?**

-- If the US continues to consider nuclear weapons a "usable" in our national security strategy, is it reasonable to assume that countries without nuclear weapons will want them?

-- How do you answer governments in the Middle East, South Asia, or elsewhere that say to you "we have security problems and need a nuclear deterrent the same a you do?"

The NPR sends a very positive message in that its bottom line is that nuclear weapons will play a much smaller role in our security strategy than ever before. Among other items, the NPR recommended significant unilateral reductions in the US nuclear force structure and concluded that it was possible to maintain a safe and secure nuclear arsenal without further nuclear testing. In addition the NPR created no new missions or scenarios for nuclear weapons use. Indeed, the entire purpose of the Department's Counterproliferation Initiative is to fashion non-nuclear responses to WMD threats or use. These measure demonstrate concretely that the US sees a lessened role for nuclear weapons in the new security environment.

Moreover, the United States works to reduce the incentive of other countries to acquire nuclear weapons in a number of ways. [SECURITY DELETION] Further, we provide positive and negative security assurances to states that have chosen to remain non-nuclear weapons states party to the NPT or similar agreements. We also strongly support international regimes -- such as NPT, nuclear weapons free zones, and the CWC and BWC -- as a means of reinforcing global norms against proliferation and provides a security framework for countries to forego or give up nuclear capabilities. Finally, we seek to lessen proliferation incentives by working with nations to address underlying security problems that often drive proliferation. In this regard, the United States has played a leadership role in the Middle East Peace Process and other regions of the world, including South Asia, to improve regional security and stability and to roll back existing nuclear programs.

<u>Question #8:</u> **When will you propose and seek negotiations with other nuclear powers -- China, France, and Great Britain -- for reductions in nuclear arsenals?**

Each of these nations has a substantially smaller nuclear force than either the United States or Russia, and all three have indicated at various times that they are not interested in participating in nuclear arms reduction talks until the U.S. and Russia reduce nuclear forces closer to their levels. We do not see a need at this time to press for their inclusion in such talks.

Why is this approach not in the U.S. national interest at this time?

Due to the disparity in force levels and the stated position of the other three declared nuclear nations, we see little benefit in pushing for their inclusion in arms reduction talks. In addition, it should be recognized that progress is sometimes more easily achieved in bilateral rather than multilateral negotiations of this kind.

Are you letting France and Britain drive policy here -- that if they don't want to negotiate arms reductions, we won't press them?

France and Britain have explicitly and repeatedly stated their position on multilateral strategic arms negotiations. Furthermore, given the disparity in force levels between these countries and the U.S. and Russia, there is little benefit to pressing to include them in a future negotiations at this time.

<u>Question #9:</u> **The Nuclear Posture Review identifies tactical nuclear weapons as potential candidates for reductions, and as high-risk weapons in terms of proliferation. Are you prepared to open immediate negotiations with Russia on reduction and destruction of this class of weapons?**

Both sides have previously pledged to make unilateral reductions in their NSNF. As a result, the United States has reduced its NSNF by 90 percent. We have withdrawn all ground- and sea-based NSNF to storage facilities in the United States, and we are continuing to eliminate all of the ground-based and a portion of the sea-based weapons. Furthermore, based on the NPR, we will remove the capability to deploy NSNF on surface naval ships, including on carrier-based aircraft. However, the NPR recommended retaining NSNF deployments in Europe as well as the capability to deploy nuclear-armed SLCMs on submarines. Russia has indicated that all former Soviet NSNF have been withdrawn to storage sites within its borders. Russia has also indicated that all of its ground-based and portions of its naval, air defense, and aviation NSNF are slated for elimination. We have encouraged the Russians to view our NPR decisions as an opportunity for them to make further reductions in their NSNF and to consolidate their remaining weapons at a smaller number of storage sites for improved security.

<u>Question #10:</u> **Are you prepared to negotiate reductions with Russia which seek to make all nuclear reductions permanent, by dismantling all nuclear warheads and storing all fissile material under international monitoring?**

At their recent summit meeting, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin directed a joint working group to pursue measures for improving confidence in and for increasing the transparency and irreversibility of the process of reducing nuclear weapons. This group has begun its work and will report on its progress at the next summit. Among other things, the group will address the feasibility and possible methods for placing certain fissile material resulting from the dismantlement process under IAEA safeguards. However, not all the fissile material from dismantled warheads will be surplus to U.S. defense needs.

-- **Are you willing to place U.S. warheads and fissile material under such a system of international monitoring?**

We are prepared to place under IAEA safeguards fissile material that we declare excess to our national security needs, and we are prepared not to use material declared excess from retired weapons to produce new types of warheads.

Question #11: **The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Extension Conference in April, 1995 will raise questions about long-term US plans, since the Treaty commits the US and the other nuclear powers to:**

> **"pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."**

-- **How does the Nuclear Posture Review square with the US commitment in the NPR to the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons?**

The Administration is committed to the obligations under Article VI of the NPT. Since 1988 we have taken steps that illustrate our commitment in reducing reliance on nuclear weapons. For example, strategic warheads have been reduced 47 percent to date and will be reduced a total of 71 percent by 2003 with the implementation of START I and START II. Non-strategic nuclear force warheads have been reduced by 90 percent. In addition, the total US active nuclear stockpile has been reduced 59 percent and will be reduced a total of 79 percent by 2003.

The NPR continues this trend. The President approved the recommendations of the NPR to reduce the planned US strategic submarine force from 18 to 14 submarines. The B-52 force was reduced by almost one-third. Two categories of non-strategic nuclear forces also were eliminated. The NPR also reaffirmed the US commitment to maintaining a safe and secure nuclear arsenal without further nuclear testing, thereby reaffirming the CTBT negotiations. All of these steps will make the credibility of the United States at the NPT Extension Conference stronger.

-- **How does this Nuclear Posture Review advance US goals for next year's NPT Treaty Extension Conference?**

We have carefully factored NPT extension considerations into every step of the NPR decision-making process. Although it is the official Administration position that the NPT should be extended on its own merits and not beheld hostage to progress--or lack thereof--on other fronts, DoD and other agencies are sensitive to the desires of many key NPT countries that the nuclear weapons states live up to their nuclear arms control and disarmament obligations under Article VI of the Treaty. In this regard, the NPR recommendations are consistent with the several Administration initiatives designed to increase the prospects for indefinite NPT extension. These include: early entry into force of START I and START II, negotiation of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, and an "updating," re-issuance, and incorporation into a UN Security Council resolution of the positive and negative security assurances (PSAs and NSAs) issued to NPT non-nuclear weapons states in good standing with that Treaty.

-- **Shouldn't the US be actively engaged in additional arms reduction talks with Russia in order to claim to the non-nuclear states at the NPT Conference that we are working in good faith to achieve the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons?**

We believe that United States will be able to show ample good faith regarding the reduction of nuclear weapons. We can point to numerous efforts toward this goal, such as the START I and START II treaties, the two unilateral Presidential Initiatives, our unilateral moratorium on underground nuclear testing as well as multilateral negotiations on comprehensive nuclear test ban, and talks on a global ban on production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, just to name a few. Furthermore, at their recent summit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to intensify a dialogue for developing steps to adapt the nuclear forces of both sides to the changed international security situation, including the possibility, after ratification of START II, of further reductions of and limitations on remaining nuclear forces.

-- **In other words, how does <u>not</u> negotiating on weapons reductions advance US non-proliferation goals?**

As mentioned above, the United States has shown ample good faith in arms reductions through its unilateral reductions in nuclear weapons that have occurred in recent years, are planned, or are underway. Further, we believe US non-proliferation goals are advanced through means other than just weapons reductions, such as through capping the production of fissile materials for weapons use, negotiating a CTBT, and continuing the current testing moratorium. The US is actively engaged with Russia bilaterally and in a multilateral forum--the Fissile Material Cut-Off negotiations to cap the production of fissile material while we undertake initiative to reduce and monitor existing stockpiles. In addition, at the September summit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to work together to assure nuclear security by exchanging detailed information on aggregate stockpiles of nuclear warheads, on stocks of fissile materials, and on their safety and security; cooperating to prevent illegal trade in nuclear materials and to strength the regime of control, accounting and physical protection of such material; and directing their joint working group on nuclear safeguards, transparency, and irreversibility to pursue by March 1995 further measures to improve confidence in and increase the transparency and irreversibility of the process of reducing nuclear weapons.

Question #12: **We still don't seem to know how many weapons the Russians have stored, how many they have destroyed, and how many weapons have been dismantled.**

-- How are you addressing this data problem with Russia?

At their recent summit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to exchange detailed aggregate information on stockpiles of nuclear warheads and fissile materials and to develop a process for exchanging this information on a regular basis. In this regard, the United States recently proposed a confidential, reciprocal exchange of aggregate information about both countries' weapons stockpiles, weapons retirements, and dismantlement schedules. We are awaiting Russia's response to our proposal.

-- Is a reciprocal data exchange a good idea, and when can we get such an agreement with Russia?

As previously mentioned, the United States has recently begun to pursue a confidential, reciprocal data exchange with Russia. We are awaiting Russia's response to our proposal.

-- Why isn't reciprocal monitoring of dismantlement and storage a good idea along the lines of the monitoring done to implement the INF Treaty?

At their recent summit meeting, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin directed a joint working group to pursue measures for improving confidence in and for increasing the transparency and irreversibility of the process of reducing nuclear weapons. This group is scheduled to begin its work by March 1995 and to report on its progress at the next summit. Among other things, the group will examine options for reciprocal inspections of storage facilities containing plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) from dismantled nuclear warheads.

-- Wouldn't such an agreement help address some of our proliferation concerns regarding Russian nuclear stocks?

Reciprocal inspections of plutonium and HEU storage facilities could encourage improved security and better material control and accounting practices so that the potential for discrepancies to arise during inspections is minimized. This in turn could help to reduce the risk of material loss.

Question #13: For decades it has been the U.S. policy that deterrence is maintained by holding at risk (i.e., targeting) those assets that the leadership in Moscow holds most dear, including the political leadership of Russia/Soviet Union, the military forces, the command and control structure, and the military industrial capability. What does the leadership in Moscow (and Minsk and Kiev) hold most dear?

(U) We do not target Russia -- or any country -- today. President Clinton's July 1994 National security Strategy states:

> We will retain strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from acting against our vital interests and convince it that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile. Therefore we will continue to maintain nuclear forces of sufficient size and capability to hold at risk a broad range of assets valued by such political and military leaders.

We believe that a future hostile Russian leadership would value most highly [SECURITY DELETION]

Question#14: Do Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazhakstan continue to target the old Soviet nuclear arsenal at the United States? How much of that old Soviet inventory is targeted at the United States? Does Russia target American cities, or U.S. military assets (i.e., counter-force or counter-value)?

Since May 1994 the U.S. nuclear forces and Russia nuclear forces (including those in Ukraine, Belarus and Kashakstan) do not target each other on a day-to-day basis. If necessary, both US and Russian forces could be retargeted quickly.

Question #15: **Is there a minimum nuclear capability below which the United States dare not go? Do you have any judgment as to what that minimum capability is that would retain the credibility of deterrence?**

The U.S. must maintain a force large enough to deter any potential aggressor. For the post-START II time frame we have determined that that force is approximately 3500 accountable strategic weapons.

At the September summit, President Clinton and President Yeltsin instructed their experts to intensify their dialogue to compare conceptual approaches and to develop concrete steps to adapt the nuclear forces and practices on both sides to the changed international security situation and to the current spirit of U.S. - Russian partnership, including the possibility, after ratification of START II of further reductions of, and limitations on, remaining nuclear forces.

Question #16: **Members of Congress were given the opportunity to review Presidential Directive 59 (PD-59) in the Carter Administration, and National Security Decision Directive 13 (NSDD-13) during the Reagan Administration. Will Members of Congress and designated congressional staff be afforded the opportunity to review Presidential Review Directive 34?**

The National Security Council is the responsible agent for all Presidential Directives; you should direct this question to the NSC staff.

Question #17: Does the United States continue to harden its satellite assets against electromagnetic pulse and the other nuclear effects that can so easily disable unprotected satellites?

-- To the extent that the U.S. armed forces will rely on commercial satellites for basic communications and other services, will those commercial satellites also be protected against nuclear attack?

The Department of Defense defines three levels of hardening for spacecraft: hardening against the natural space environment; protection against collateral nuclear attack (i.e., a low altitude burst); and protection against direct nuclear attack (i.e., a burst directed against a particular satellite, at a commensurate altitude). Protection against the natural space environment is the current standard for US commercial satellites and raises the costs about 1 percent above the non-hardened designs. Hardening against the collateral threat raises the costs by about 3 percent and is the current and future standard for military satellites. Hardening against direct attack was the standard for our strategic space systems in the past, raising the price by about 5 percent [SECURITY DELETION]

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